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FEDERAL COURTS AT THE CROSSROADS: ADAPT OR LOSE!

Judge Robert M. Parker*
Leslie J. Hagin**
It is beyond reasonable doubt that our federal courts, especially the courts of
appeal, are in serious trouble.1 Caseloads are at levels that fundamentally undermine the ability of these courts to administer justice, given the courts' current procedures and structural configuration; the courts of appeal, especially, are
suffering from case overload-with nothing but worse times ahead if present
courses are continued. Fifth Circuit Judge Carolyn Dineen King has welldescribed the paradigmatic situation in the second largest court of appeals:
In the first eight months of the statistical year ending June 30, 1992, I turned out 159
opinions, or twenty per month. Effectively, we are required to turn out one opinion

* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. B.B.A., University of Texas, 1961; J.D., University of Texas School of Law, 1964. Prior to his elevation to the Fifth Circuit, Judge Parker served for 15 years as a
United States district court judge for the Eastern District of Texas, the last four of these as Chief Judge. In addition, Judge Parker chaired the United States Judicial Conference's Committee on Court Administration and Case
Management from 1990-1993. Also from 1990-1991, Judge Parker served as a member of the Judicial Conference's Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation. And from 1987-1990, he served as a member of the Judicial
Conference's Committee on Judicial Improvements.
** Law Clerk to Judge Robert M. Parker, 1992-1994. B.A., Austin College, 1988; J.D., University of Texas
School of Law, 1991.
1.As the Chief of the Long Range Planning Office of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts,
Charles W. Nihan, has written in a paper developed for the Federal-States Jurisdiction Committee of the United
States Judicial Conference:
While expansion of the district court caseload was significant in the [19]60s, growth of the appellate
caseload was explosive: between 1960 and 1970 the number of appeals commenced increased by almost
200%, a compound annual growth rate of 11.5%. ...
To deal with this flood of appeals, there were 97 authorized circuit judgeships in 1970, up 43% from
1960. However, expansion of authorized circuit judgeships did not approach the pace of caseload growth,
and appeals per authorized circuit judgeships were more than double the 1960 level.
Paralleling the continued rapid growth of the district caseload, the level of appellate filings nearly doubled from 1970 to 1980, with 23,200 appeals commenced .... Caseload per judgeship increased by
46 % to 176 as the number of authorized appeals judgeships expanded to 132.
Appellate growth showed a modest abatement in the 1980s as the number of appeals rose 76% to
40,898. The percentage of criminal appeals was again about 23 %. At the same time the number of authorized judgeships expanded from 132 to 156, an increase of just over 18 %. Consequently, despite the expansion of the appellate bench, per judgeship filings rose again by nearly 50% to 262.
Total appeals commenced .... ha[ve] demonstrated remarkably steady and stable trend growth at the
rate of 7.7% per year. This will, if continued, lead to a doubling of appeals commenced about every nine
years.
Memorandum from Charles W. Nihan, Chief, Long Range Planning Office of the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts, to Judge Robert M. Parker, attachment (May 6, 1994) ("Appellate Activity by Decade,
1950-1990") [hereinafter Nihan-Parker Memorandum] (on file with the Mississippi College Law Review). See
infra apps. A and B for graphic displays of the above-described trends (also attachments to the Nihan-Parker
Memorandum) (on file with the Mississippi CollegeLaw Review) (information source: Analytical Studies Group,
Long Range Planning Office, Administrative Office of the United States Courts).
And yet, as is inevitable-and generally healthy-in important subjects of discourse, there are a few, well-intentioned and eloquent even though wrong, doubters. See, e.g., Judge G. Thomas Eisele, Differing Visions-Differing Values:A Comment on Judge ParkersReformation Modelfor FederalDistrict Courts, 46 SMU L. REV.1935,
1936-38 (1993) (part of a special edition on alternative dispute resolution and procedural justice).
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almost every working day, based on a six-day work week, and to carefully review
two other opinions. We also have a docket consisting of motions and petitions for
rehearings that total 496 per judge per year, or 1.4 per calendar day. Our statistics
show that the total number of judicial matters that each judge on this court works on
per year is approximately 1,000. That number has more than quadrupled in the last
thirty-two years.'
Judge Stephen Reinhardt, of the even larger Ninth Circuit, has expressed himself
similarly:
We seem to assume that judges can perform the same quality of work regardless of
the number of cases they are assigned. That simply is not correct. Most of us are
now working to maximum capacity. As a result, when our caseload increases, we
inevitably pay less attention to the individual cases.
doing the
I speak primarily about the courts of appeals. Those who believe we are
3
same quality work that we did in the past are simply fooling themselves.
Indeed, in addition to poor quality justice, a crisis in citizen confidence in the legal
system, and an overthrow of our governmental principle of federalism, the federal
case overload actually works to irrationally increase litigation as the coherence or
predictability of "the law" devolves to a chaotic level.
In this Article we seek to establish that reformation of our federal court
resource is needed - especially at the court of appeals level - in order to restore
and conserve the federal court system within our constitutional scheme of

2. Judge Carolyn Dineen King, Commentary, A Matter of Conscience, 28 Hous. L. REv. 955, 956 (1991)
[hereinafter King] (citing Clerk's Report, tbl. 2-Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Workload Per Active Judge on
66% Summary II Rate and 7 Weeks of Court- 1991 (1992)). See also id.at 962-63 (referencing then-Justice
Rehnquist's recognition in his 1976 remarks to the American Bar Association, of the jeopardy (even then) confronting the justice principle that each case be fully considered and understood by the judge):
That principle is in serious jeopardy today. . . .In my view, no judge would specifically condone a twotrack justice system: one for the haves and one for the have-nots. The problem is that a two-track system
can slip into the nodus operandi of even a conscientious but overloaded judge without the judge even being aware of it.
In this Article, we do propose a "two-track," appellate case management system for appeals; but it is not the
irrational and unfair one described by Judge King-bifurcated according to whether a litigant is an economic
"have" or an economic "have-not." Rather, our proposed appellate system is based on fair and reasonable adjudicatory principles relative to the judicial resources called for by the character of the case on appeal.
3. Judge Stephen Reinhardt, A Plea to Save the Federal Courts: Too Few Judges, Too Many Cases, 79 A.B.A.
J. 52, 53 (Jan. 1993) [hereinafter Reinhardt] (adaptation of a letter Judge Reinhardt wrote on October 2, 1992, to
Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (D-Del.), Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, and Representative Jack Brooks
(D-Tex.), Chair of the House Judiciary Committee).

19941

FEDERAL COURTSAT THE CROSSROADS: ADAPTOR LOSE!

government.' Efficiency for "efficiency's sake" does not motivate our suggested
reforms, but we think federal court efficiency is essential to the vitality of the
courts. A federal judicial system that is inefficient-as ours has become and is increasingly becoming -endangers the basic principles of our national justice resource: quality resolution of our country's most fundamental, important, and
complex legal concerns within the context of the well-balanced governmental fabric of federalism. As the Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Joseph R.
Biden, Jr., aptly put it before a gathering of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals not
long ago: "[P]racticality, efficiency, and time[li]ness all impact on whether or not
we are able to assure equal justice under the law."' Or, as Judiciary Committee
Member, Senator Charles E. Grassley, stated in his recent remarks before the Judicial Conference of the United States: "Changes are coming to the federal courts.
And that is a good development. Because there is frustration and dissatisfaction
with our legal system. It costs too much and it takes too long -those are the most
common complaints by the users of our courts." 6 Thus, albeit as ajustice "helper,"
efficiency is a central subject of our Article.
Like the February 16, 1993, Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on
Court Administration and Case Management to the Judicial Conference Committee on Long Range Planning, we have reached two overarching conclusions:

4. For our specific proposals regarding also-necessary, conjoint reformation of civil dispute resolution procedures in the federal district courts, see Judge Robert M. Parker & Leslie J. Hagin, "ADR" Techniques in the
Reformation Model of Civil Dispute Resolution, 46 SMU L. REv. 1905 (1993) [hereinafter Parker & Hagin] (lead
article in a special edition devoted to issues of alternative dispute resolution and procedural justice). See, e.g., id.
at 1909 (citations omitted):
Under the continued reign of the traditional civil litigation model, there is no reason to expect an abatement of these unwelcome [case overload, cost, and delay] attributes of civil dispute resolution. For example, the Administrative Office of the United States Courts forecasts that court of appeals caseloads
(obviously, a function ofdistrict court filings) will nearly triple in the next twenty-five years. Meanwhile,
filings in the district courts will triple. And filings in bankruptcy courts - whose decisions are, with a possible exception in the Ninth Circuit, appealable to the district courts and on up the federal court hierarchy should more than triple.
See also Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, "Civil Justice System Improvements," Remarks Before the American Bar
Association, at I (Dec. 14, 1993) (transcript on file with the MississippiCollegeLaw Review) (citations omitted):
Trial. . . is a notoriously expensive and arduous way of resolving disputes. Accordingly, not all courthouse doors ought to lead to the courtroom. Instead, there should be alternate routes-options-including such innovations as early neutral evaluation, mediation, negotiation, arbitration, mini-trials, and
summary jury trials.
At the same time that the courts and bar explore alternatives to litigation, we must continue reforming the
traditional approach as well. In particular, discovery has been a great source of expense, delay, and, for
attorney and client alike, irritation. . . .It seems clear that discovery is not doing what it was designed to
do: While it consumes more and more time and resources, it appears to be contributing less and less to
our system ofjustice. No one proposes doing away with discovery; but it is, I think we can all agree, a
dysfunctional part of our legal system-one that warrants attention and reform.
5. Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Remarks Before the Judicial Conference of the Third Circuit (Apr. 19, 1993)
(transcript on file with the Mississippi College Law Review).
6. Senator Charles E. Grassley, Remarks Befbre the Judicial Conference of the United States (Mar. 15, 1994)
(transcript on file with the Mississippi College Law Review) . See also Judge Alvin B. Rubin, Reallocation:A TwoWay Street, in FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER,

THE FEDERAL APPELLATE JUDICIARY IN THE

21ST

CENTURY

123 (Cyn-

thia Harrison & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1989) [hereinafter Rubin] ("The common theme that runs through this
discussion [about the federal appellate judiciary in the next century] is that, whatever peripheral problems may
face the federal courts of appeals, the basic problem that must now be addressed is their caseload.").
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1. Substantial change in both the structure of the federal courts and the manner in
which they provide services to the nation is essential to maintaining the historical
nature of the institution and continuing to play a vital role in our nation's affairs.
2. The Long Range Planning Committee should serve not only as a clearinghouse
for suggestions such as the ones contained in this report, but it should also be the
forum for extended debate on these and other issues.7

More specific, our position is that the necessary reform of the federal courts must
be multi-faceted -that it must take place on several planes of our governmental
system. 8 The critical keys to federal court conservation lie in federal-state jurisdictional reform, and in procedural and structural reformation of the courts of appeal.
The late Fifth Circuit Judge Alvin Rubin hit upon this fundamental truth before
we:

If the problem is caseload, there are only two basic ways to deal with it. One is to
decrease the total number of cases that are filed in the district courts, thus decreasing the total universe of federal cases and hence the number of judgments from
which appeals can be taken. The other is simply not to permit appeals from all of the

final judgments and other decisions of district courts and administrative agencies
that are now appealable. This might be accomplishedby requiring those who wish to
appeal to the circuit courts to seek some sort of writ of review. This might be applicable in all cases or only in some, such as diversity cases. 9

We think it is clear that the achievement of federal court restoration and conservation requires that both these approaches be taken. Additionally, we think the
certiorari-like, circuit-level writ of review mechanism should apply to all cases.
Finally, we are of the opinion that structural reformation is also needed.
Our discussion proceeds as follows. In part I of this Article, we discuss the
Report of the Court Administration and Case Management Committee of the Judicial Conference to the Long Range Planning Committee of the Conference [hereinafter the Report]. In the Report, the Court Administration and Case Management
Committee of the Judicial Conference reported its findings, conclusions, and recommendations for the appropriate present and future role of the federal courts - in
furtherance of debate and other forms of consideration necessary to inform the

7.

JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON CouRT ADMINISTRATION AND CASE MANAGEMENT, REPORT TO THE

1-2 (1993) [hereinafter COMMITTEE REPoRT] (on
file with the MississippiCollege LawReview). The Report is reprinted in its entirety as Appendix C to this Article.
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING

8. See, e.g., COMMITTEE

REPORT,

supra note 7, at 3-4 (hereto attached as Appendix C, at 250) (citing Chief

Justice William H. Rehnquist, Remarks to the American Bar Association's House of Delegates, at 10 (Feb. 4,
1992)):
There is no single path to meeting the challenge facing us. We must continue to perform at our highest
level of quality and efficiency and we must bring to bear the reserves of commitment and cooperation at
all levels of government. In issuing his call for reexamination of the role of federal courts, Chief Justice
Rehnquist has called on us to (1) recognize the benefits of renewed cooperation with the state court systems; (2) consider curtailing some federal jurisdiction; and (3) avoid adding new federal causes of action
unless critical to meeting important national interests which cannot otherwise be satisfied through nonjudicial forums, alternative dispute resolution techniques, or the state courts.
9. Rubin, supra note 6, at 123 (emphasis added).
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Long Range Planning Committee's decision regarding the latter's forthcoming,
comprehensive Long Range Plan for the federal courts.10 In part II of our Article,
we address what is wrong with the current, traditional mode of treating federal
court problems- the dead-end course of incessant growth. Part III delineates general aspects of our recommended conservationist reform of the national court system: (1) efficiency, including differentiated case management mechanisms (case
tracking devices) at the district court level; (2) a limited appellate court structure;
and (3) jurisdictional restraint, both in terms of new legislative proposals and in
terms of the divestiture of existing federal jurisdiction that is inconsistent with basic notions of well-balanced federalism. And in part IV, we focus on what we regard to be the cornerstone of restoration and conservation of the federal court
system: the procedural imperative of differential appellate case management. We
will explain how this appellate court device allows for the critically important,
fair, principled deployment of the federal court resource by providing the courts of
appeal with the capacity to distinguish between those cases deserving of the
courts' plenary review and those not so deserving. 1 In part V, we discuss what the
federal courts might need and be able to do, through their inherent powers, to preserve and conserve themselves should Congress fail to meaningfully reform federal court structures and procedures and curtail its own penchant for
ever-expanding the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Finally, in part VI, we address the ultimate price to be paid for the shirking of federal court reform: the demise of quality adjudication in the federal courts and the overthrow of federalism.

10. The Long Range Planning Committee of the Judicial Conference was established at the direction of Chief
Justice Rehnquist. According to its mission statement, this Committee is "[t]o coordinate the planning activities
of thejudiciary and propose a long range plan to the Judicial Conference." WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, CHARGE TO
THE LoNG RANGE PLANNING COMMITTEE (on file with the Mississippi College Law Review). More specific, the
Long Range Planning Committee's charge is to:
1. Promote, encourage, and coordinate planning activities within the judicial branch.
2. Advise and make recommendations to the Judicial Conference regarding planning mechanisms and strategies, including the establishment of a coordinated judiciary planning process.
3. In consultation with and participation by other committees, members of the judiciary, and
other interested parties, coordinate the identification of emerging trends, the definition of broad
issues confronting the judiciary, and the development of strategies and plans for addressing them.
4. Evaluate and report on the planning efforts of the judiciary.
5. Based on advice from other Judicial Conference committees, judges and interested parties,
prepare and submit for Judicial Conference approval, a long range plan for the judiciary and periodic updates to that plan.
Id.
1I. See, e.g., Judge Joseph F Weis, Jr., Restoring the Authority of the District Court, in FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CENTER, THE FEDERAL APPELLATE JUDICIARY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 97, 99 (Cynthia Harrison & Russell R.
Wheeler eds., 1989) [hereinafter Weis]:
What we should keep in mind is that there are two separate functions of the appellate court, the errorcorrecting function and the law-giving function. They do not always deserve the same treatment.
Some of our problems are created by the fact that we now treat all appeals in the same way. Perhaps we
need to be more discriminating in our procedures.
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I. HIGHLIGHTS OF THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
COMMITTEE ON COURT ADMINISTRATION AND CASE MANAGEMENT TO
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING
The Report to the Judicial Conference Committee on Long Range Planning
by the Court Administration and Case Management Committee [the latter,
hereinafter the Committee] recommends that any long range plan adopted should
attempt to maintain a fundamentally limited Federal Judiciary. The hope expressed by this Report is that the number of Article IlI judges not exceed 1000.12
From an organizational standpoint, the Report recommends a federal court
structure consisting of ten circuits, each containing one court of appeals and one
district court, with each court of appeals being comprised of twelve judges."
From the procedural point of view, a two-track method of appellate review, closely
resembling the process for petitioning the United States Supreme Court for certiorari, is recommended for the courts of appeal. 14 Under such a system, a Track One
brief would be limited to fifteen pages -containing: a list of all parties unless the
names appear in the caption of the case; a table of authorities; a jurisdictional
statement; a short and concise statement of the questions presented for review; a
concise statement of the material facts; and argument on the merits.' 5 An appendix would contain the usual "judgments, opinions, orders, findings of fact, and
conclusions of law" made by the district court, and appropriate record excerpts.16
Track Two under this proposed system of appellate review is plenary review.17
With respect to cases assigned to Track Two review by a court of appeals, the court
might permit or require the parties to supplement the briefs filed in Track One to
the extent ordered; permit fuller briefing of the questions presented for review;

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

COMMITTEE REPORT,

COMMITTEE
COMMITTEE
COMMITTEE
COMMITTEE
COMMITTEE

REPORT,
REPORT,
PErorT,
REroRr,
REPORT,

supra note 7,
supra note 7,
supra note 7,
supra note 7,
supra note 7,
supra note 7,

at 3-8 (hereto attached as Appendix C, at 250-52).
at 8-10 (hereto attached as Appendix C, at 252-53).
at 10-12 (hereto attached as Appendix C, at 253-54).
at 10 (hereto attached as Appendix C, at 254).
at 18, attachment B (hereto attached as Appendix C, at 259-60).
at 10-12 (hereto attached as Appendix C, at 254-55).
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and/or permit or require the supplementing of the record by the parties. " The circuit court may consider Track Two appeals with or without oral argument."9
The Committee's recommendations recognize that historically, fairly, and efficiently, the federal courts have reflected the federalism-focused intent to provide a
fundamentally-limited, distinctive judicial forum designed to perform tasks not
ordinarily appropriate for the state courts.2 The recommendations reflect a concern that this fundamentally-limited, distinctive role of the federal courts is being
subverted by moves toward a blanket policy of assigning to the federal courts tasks
historically assigned to state courts and cases not necessarily involving the protection of individual liberties, of national effect, or falling within certain categories of
complexity best addressed by the federal courts.2"
More specific, the Report expresses the Committee's studied concern that this
apparently incessant drift toward unlimited federal court growth will alter the beneficial, and constitutional, balance of state and federal responsibilities, which will
in turn alter the character of the federal bench -transforming the federal courts
into creatures indistinguishable from state courts.22 The Report reflects a consensus that continuation on the course followed over the past thirty years will soon
result in a Federal Judiciary of unacceptable size with an attendant, unacceptably
huge, supporting bureaucracy.23
Thus, the recommendation to limit the number of appellate judges on each circuit to twelve follows from the systemic fundamental that each federal circuit must
create and sustain a "coherent body of circuit law," and that this predictability of
law is "created and preserved by a body of judges [a circuit] small enough to function truly as a court."24 The risk associated with the unpredictability that has been
characterized as the now-too-common "law of the panel" is greatly enhanced in a

18.

COMMITTEE REPORT,

supra note 7, at 19, attachment B (hereto attached as Appendix C, at 259-60).

19. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 7, at 19, attachment.B (hereto attached as Appendix C, at 259-60). This is
consistent with existing rules. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a):

Oral argument will be allowed unless
(1) the appeal is frivolous; or
(2) the dispositive issue or set of issues has been recently authoritatively decided; or
(3) the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record and the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument.
See also Judge John J. Gibbons, MaintainingEffective Proceduresin the FederalAppellateCourts, in FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, THE FEDERAL APPELLATE JUDICIARY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 22,24 (Cynthia Harrison & Russell R.
Wheeler eds., 1989):
[N]o amount of ingenuity will produce a scheme whereby a circuit judge can hear argument in 330 or
more cases a year. The oral-argument tradition in appellate courts is inherently inefficient ....
After 18
years of listening, I for one am ready to support a rule that there is a presumption against oral argument,
that the norm should be appellate review on the papers. I make this suggestion mindful of the fact that
such a rule would make more acute the public perception of the invisible, unaccountable judiciary. But
the trend is inevitable, and articulation of the norm of appellate review on the papers would at least be
candid.
20. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 7, at 3 (hereto attached as Appendix C, at 250).
2 1. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 7, at 3 (hereto attached as Appendix C, at 250).
22. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 7, at 4-5 (hereto attached as Appendix C, at 250-51).
23. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 7, at 6-8 (hereto attached as Appendix C, at 251-52).
24. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 7, at 9 (hereto attached as Appendix C, at 253).
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large court of appeals (a "mega-circuit").2 Intra-circuit conflicts are spawned and
fostered in "mega-circuits." 26 And the "signal of unpredictability" thereby sent is,
of course, unsettling to those who are supposed to follow, and base their affairs on
the decisions rendered by the circuit courts: the public at large, the business community even more specifically, and the district courts.2 7 This unpredictability of
law generates still more litigation; such an unpredictable system of justice encourages parties to "roll the dice" to see what panel, or "lot," they draw.28
The Report's proposed two-track method of appellate review is designed to provide the judges on a court of appeals with sufficient information to dispose of a
significant number of cases at the Track-One stage without further submission by
the parties or additional costs to the litigants.29 The Report takes the position that
its recommended two-track, differential case management methodology is preferable to "pure" discretionary review." In light of the fact that the federal courts of
appeal historically have been courts concerned with error correction as well as
law-giving, the Committee concluded that a pure discretionary review model of
differential appellate case management would not adequately allow for the circuits' continued fulfillment of their error-correction function. 1 However, while
we basically agree with the Committee's two-track, case differential recommendation, we think the increased efficiencies secured by the implementation of this
particular two-track methodology, at best, serve as "stop-gap solutions" to the case
overload problems facing the courts of appeal. We do not think this particular twotrack proposal of the Report will be able to provide a satisfactory solution to the
case overload problems confronting the courts of appeal for any significant period
of time. We envision that in the near future the implementation of a pure discretionary review mechanism will be necessary -in order to preserve the essential
nature of the courts of appeal by avoiding both of the otherwise inevitable, subverting federal circuit "non-options" of: (1) the merging of the courts of appeal
into a set of internally-chaotic, monstrous, "mega-circuits;" and (2) the deconstruction and proliferation of the courts of appeal into a set of interactivelychaotic, atomic, "mani-circuits."
II.

THE "MEGA,"

THE "MANI,"

AND OTHER GROWTH-ORIENTED PROPOSALS

FOR RECONSTRUCTION OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEAL

As the Chair of the House Judiciary Committee, Jack Brooks, well-noted in his
May, 1993, remarks to the Federal Judges Association: "It is how we respond to
th[e] growing 'disconnect' between [limited federal court] resources and [the fed-

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

See COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 7, at 9-10 (hereto attached as Appendix C, at 253-54).
See COMMITTEE REPORT,supra note 7, at 9-10 (hereto attached as Appendix C, at 253-54).
See COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 7, at 10 (hereto attached as Appendix C, at 254).
See COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 7, at 10 (hereto attached as Appendix C, at 254).
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 7, at 10-11 (hereto attached as Appendix C, at 254).
COMMIT-EE REPORT, supra note 7, at 11-12 (hereto attached as Appendix C, at 254-55).
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 7, at 11-12 (hereto attached as Appendix C, at 254-55).
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eral courts'] constitutional obligation [to administer justice in a fair and efficient
manner] that will define the future of the federal judiciary."32
The most often proposed federal appellate court "reform" measures are struc33
tural or organizational, and in one way or another they are growth-oriented..
Such growth-bound proposals usually take one of two basic forms: (1) the merging of the courts of appeal into an internally-chaotic, small set of monstrous
"mega-circuits;" and (2) deconstruction and proliferation of the courts of appeal
into an interactively-chaotic, large set of atomic "mani-circuits."
Further, within the "mega-circuit" fold, there are two rather distinct substrata
of proposals most often advocated: (1) a "simple" increase in the number ofjudges
in the currently-constructed circuits - e. g., the "Reinhardt proposal;"3 4 and (2) the
re-alignment of the current number of circuits into a very few circuits, of broader
regional compass - e.g., the "Wallace proposal." 3"
Judge Alvin Rubin may have best summarized what is wrong with both the
mega and mani-circuit proposals:
We've tried all the easy solutions: dividing circuits, adding more judges and more
staff, and utilizing mechanical aids like computers ....So we are left with finding
some other method to solve the problem of expanding caseload- and with finding a
3
solution to the other problems that are incidental to the caseload problem. "
The mega and mani-circuit proposals for "reforming" the courts of appeal share
the infirmity of being but more of the same old easy "solutions" to which Judge
Rubin referred - which have been often and fairly tried, but which have failed (and
indeed, exacerbated the very institutional ailments they were supposed to cure or
at least alleviate). We think it is clear that simply pursuing more of these inadequate measures will not turn their inadequacies into adequacies; two (or even
more) "wrongs" will not "right" our federal courts of appeal.

32. Representative Jack Brooks, Remarks Before the Federal Judges Association (May 19, 1993) (transcript
on file with the Mississippi College Law Review). See also Professor Felix Frankfurter, Distribution ofJudicial
Power Between United States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499,499 (1928) ("Nothing but good can come
from a [periodic] re-examination of the purposes to be served by the federal courts.").
33. Similar strains of the growth-oriented appellate court proposals exist relative to the federal district courts.
See, e.g., Reinhardt, supra note 3, at 53 (stating, "Iam less able to speak with authority concerning the district
courts, although I suspect their problems are very similar to [those in the appellate courts] . . . and that there is a
desperate need for additional district judges;" and prescribing in particular a doubling of the number of judges in
the courts of appeal). But simple proposals for increased district court judgeships are likewise fundamentally
flawed. We focus in this Article on the intermediate appellate court proposals because the intermediate appellate
courts are suffering from threats to quality adjudication and federalism to an even greater extent than are the district courts, because such proposals are the ones most often heard, and because the suffering of the circuits upsets
the entire federal court system. But, as we have already addressed in detail elsewhere, we think the district courts
are also in need of significant reformation. See Parker & Hagin, supra note 4.
34. See Reinhardt, supra note 3.
35. See Judge J. Clifford Wallace, The Nature and Extent of Intercircuit Conflicts: A Solution Needed for a
Mountain or a Molehill?, 71 CAL. L. REV. 913 (1983) [hereinafter Wallace].
36. Rubin, supra note 6, at 123.
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A. The Demerits of 'Mega-Circuits"
1. The Reinhardt Proposal
Judge Stephen Reinhardt of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has been a vocal
proponent of an increased judge roll for caseload relief in the federal courts of appeal: "Simply put, our federal court system is too small for the job. . . . My proposal is simply that Congress double the size of the courts of appeal. I base this not
on studies or statistics, but on practical knowledge and experience."37 Of course,
the Ninth Circuit is already the largest circuit in the nation.
We think Chief Eleventh Circuit, and Former (pre-divided) Fifth Circuit Judge
Gerald Bard Tjoflat has eloquently explained what is wrong with Judge
Reinhardt's proposal to drastically increase the federal circuit judge rolls.38 As
Chief Judge Tjoflat has written, mega-circuits-or in his phrase, "jumbo
courts" -disturb the clarity and stability of the law, which in turn increases litigiousness and complicates the disposition of cases.
Jumbo courts encourage litigants to demand more of the court's resources; litigants
are more willing to bring (and defend) claims in the hope of exploiting the indistinct
jurisprudence of the circuit or by drawing a sympathetic appellate panel. We can
expect a court of appeals' filings-per-judge to increase as the number of judges on
that court increases, further diminishing the benefits attributable to new judges. 39
And, as Chief Judge Owen M. Panner of the District of Oregon has explained the
district courts' quandary in the already "mega" Ninth Circuit: "[T]here is inconsistency in decisions and it is hard to keep up."40 When the law is unstable, parties
cannot know what to expect; their legal rights and entitlements depend largely on
"the luck of the draw" - i.e., "on the trial judge (and ultimately on the three-judge
appellate panel) that they draw."4 1
Further, as the Report explains, circuit judge collegiality is a critical element in
our societal conception that vital decisions made by single individuals should be
reviewed by others-e.g., by co-appellate panelists. 42 We agree that collegiality
"helps to assure that the reviewers are speaking from shared values of the legal system even when they disagree on specific [processes and] outcomes."' And like
the Committee, "we are confident that the diminution of collegiality in courts
larger than twelve [judges] is a risk that the judicial system and the nation can ill
afford.""
37. Reinhardt, supra note 3, at 52, 53. See also Judge Jon 0. Newman, Are 1,000 FederalJudges Enough ? Yes.
More Would Dilute the Quality, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1993, at A 17; Judge Stephen Reinhardt, Are 1,000 Federal
Judges Enough ? No. More Cases Should be Heard, N.Y. TIMEs, May 17, 1993, at A 17.
38. Judge Gerald Bard Tjoflat, More Judges, Less Justice: The Case Against Expansion of the FederalJudiciary,
79 A.B.A. J. 70 (July 1993) (a reply to Judge Reinhardt's January, 1993, article in the A. B.A. Journal).
39. Id. at71.
40. Id. (quoting Chief Judge Panner).
41. Id. at 73.
42. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 7, at 10 (hereto attached as Appendix C, at 253-54).
43. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 7, at 10 (hereto attached as Appendix C, at 253-54).
44. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 7, at 10 (hereto attached as Appendix C, at 253-54).
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In brief, we agree with this much of Judge Reinhardt's plea to the Chairs of the
House and Senate Judiciary Committees: "a radical approach is necessary,"
"[t]ime is of the essence," and "it is time to start thinking 'big' [as] [i]ncremental
[measures] will not solve our problem."" But we do not share Judge Reinhardt's
view that the type of radical "reform" measure needed is essentially a compounding or exponential expansion of the tried-and-failed, "add (judges) and divide (circuits)," "business as usual" approach to the problems associated with the federal
court caseload. 4" Nonetheless, as the Report emphasizes, the Committee's recommendation (which we embrace), to cap the size of the Federal Judiciary, is limited
to tenured Article III judges. 47 The Report recognizes that "increasing the number
of magistrate[and bankruptcy]judgesmay be essential to secure the case management efficiencies that will conserve more of the time of tenured judges for tasks
constitutionally reserved to them."' Since magistrate and bankruptcy judges "are
not guaranteed life tenure, their numbers may be more readily adjusted" as needs
be.49 The Report also reflects the expectation that the need for magistrate judges
will grow if their roles continue to be expansively defined and they are actually utilized with regularity - as we think they should be. 50
2. The Wallace Proposal
Ninth Circuit Chief Judge J. Clifford Wallace does not appear to share all the
thinking of Judge Reinhardt on the subject of the proper, workable "shape" of the
courts of appeal. But nonetheless, Chief Judge Wallace's big court proposal is a
"mega-circuit" animal.
Chief Judge Wallace is not persuaded of the need to split the Ninth Circuit or
that the general circuit structure needs to be limited to the ten circuits recom-

45. Reinhardt, supra note 3, at 54.
46. Rather, we agree with the view expressed not long ago by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, in her December,
1993, remarks to the American Bar Association's conference on problems of the civil justice system: The Summit
on Civil Justice Improvements. As Justice O'Connor emphasized, the United States legal profession has served
our country well in the past; and it can continue to serve the country well. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, "Civil
Justice System Improvements," Remarks Before the American Bar Association (Dec. 14, 1993) (transcript on
file with the MississippiCollege Law Review). But we cannot perform this service if we continue with "business as
usual." Id. We also agree with Justice O'Connor's more specific comments encouraging the courts' evolution into
comprehensive justice centers, or "multi-door courthouses;" and encouraging the seeking of "common ground"
by those involved in civil justice improvement, problem-solving efforts. See generally Parker & Hagin, supra note
4.
47. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 7, at 8 (hereto attached as Appendix C, at 253).
48. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 7, at 8 (emphasis added) (hereto attached as Appendix C, at 253).
49. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 7, at 8 (hereto attached as Appendix C, at 253).
50. See COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 7, at 8 (hereto attached as Appendix C, at 253). See generally FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, STRUCTURAL AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS: REPORT
TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS AND THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 129-33 (1993) [hereinafter STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES]; see generally A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE AUTHOR-

ITY (Admin. Office of the United States Courts, 1993). See also Justice William H. Rehnquist, Remarks Before
the Annual Dinner of the American Bar Association (Aug. 9, 1976) (transcript on file with the Mississippi College Law Review) ("You will never convince most people that only a candidate for judicial office combining the
talents of Justinian, Lord Mansfield, and Learned Hand iscapable of deciding whether the finding of a Social
Security examiner is supported by substantial evidence considered on the record as a whole."), quoted in King,
supra note 2, at 962.
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mended by the Report."1 Instead, he favors an appellate system of four or five
(very) large circuits, each containing however many judges are needed to meet the
caseload demands.5 2 He is not persuaded that such a system would generate administrative problems, and he is not persuaded that intra-circuit conflicts fostered
by this structure would be a significant problem; he regards any intra-circuit conflicts increased by his restructuring proposal to be manageable. 3 He believes that
with proper administration, such courts can be efficient, and that they would be
capable of creating and sustaining the systemically-important "law of the circuit,"
therefore contributing to more uniformity of law. 4 And Chief Judge Wallace
thinks a particularly beneficial aspect of his plan is the mitigation of inter-circuit
conflicts.
We do not share Chief Judge Wallace's faith in the manageability of the administrative unwieldiness and intra-circuit decisional conflicts his structural proposal
would foster. The other most significant problem we have with his proposal is the
same one we have with the "adding" of judges proposal made by Judge Reinhardt,
as discussed above. We think that experience has well shown that adding judges
simply contributes to a negative cycle of adding judges and adding federal jurisdiction (caseloads) - with all the concomitant compounding of legal uncertainty, administrative unwieldiness, and federalism-offending attributes of this
tried-and-failed approach to the problems of structural and procedural inadequacy,
and case overload, in the federal courts.
3. Civil Rights and Liberties and the "Mega-Circuit"
The "old (pre-division) Fifth Circuit," through the leadership of Judge John R.
Brown - ably assisted by Judges Rives, Tuttle, and Wisdom - sent the clear, unmistakable message to the South that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 indeed reflected the law of the land and would be enforced.5 6
The court was structurally small enough and had a caseload that permitted it to
speak with one voice. That voice and its clear message of authority, or predictability, transformed the South. If the old Fifth Circuit had been a Wallace or a
Reinhardt mega-circuit, we believe that all too often the law that would have been
produced during that critical period would have been the "law of the panel" instead
of the law of the circuit, and accordingly, that the authority of civil rights would
have been greatly compromised -tragically resulting in much greater litigation
resisting the implementation of equal rights for all the citizens of the South.

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

at 940-41.
at 940-4 1.
at 941.
at 923-24.
at 928-32.
56. See JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES 101-02 (198 1).
See,
See,
See,
See,
See,

e.g.,
e.g.,
e.g.,
e.g.,
e.g.,

Wallace,
Wallace,
Wallace,
Wallace,
Wallace,

supra note 35,
supra note 35,
supra note 35,
supra note 35,
supra note 35,
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B. The Demerits of 'Mani-Circuits"
As a recent Federal Judicial Center Report to Congress and the Judicial Conference states: While "[t]here is widespread, though far from universal, sentiment for
courts of fewer than fifteen active judgeships," the Center's "survey of federal
judges discovered little sentiment. . for most means to" the end of achieving and
maintaining circuit courts of fewer than fifteen judges. 57 Circuit splitting was the
"remedy" to appellate court growth problems in the Fifth and Ninth Circuits recommended in 1973 by the congressionally-created, multi-branch-membered,
"Hruska Commission."58 Some still claim this approach would achieve the generally desired, less-than-fifteen-judges circuit shape. But we think this approach is
simply "part two" of what Professor Thomas Baker has described as the "add
(judges) and divide (circuits)," misguided approach to circuit court structural reform (with the Reinhardt proposal for doubling the number of circuit court judges
representing, in our view, "part one" of this "add and divide" double negative)."
A fundamental value furthered by regional federal circuit courts is the countering or ameliorating of parochialism inhering in more localized courts. As the
Federal Judicial Center's recent report states: "Most observers fear that a large increase in the number of circuits will result in further 'balkenization' of the federal
courts. A system of many small circuits dilutes the federalizing function of the
courts of appeals." 6 Or as former Fifth Circuit Judge Thomas G. Gee has put it:
"[A]re we to continue the splitting process until it becomes mincing, with a United

57. STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES, supra note 50, at 113.
58. See Act of Oct. 13, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-489, 86 Stat. 807 (1973); Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, The GeographicalBoundariesof the SeveralJudicial Circuits:Recommendationsfor
Change, 62 F.R.D. 223 (1973). This commission was chaired by Senator Roman L. Hruska, with Judge J.
Edward Lumbard serving as Vice Chairman and Professor A. Leo Levin serving as Executive Director; Professor Arthur D. Hellman served as Deputy Executive Director; Bennett G. Gaines, Esq., served as Staff Attorney;
and William F. Sheehan, HI, Esq., served as Consultant to the Commission. Other members- four appointed by
President Nixon, four by Chief Justice Burger, and four each from the Senate and the House of Representativeswere: Representative Jack Brooks; Senator Quentin N. Burdick; Representative Emanuel Celler; Dean Roger C.
Cramton; Representative Walter Flowers; Senator Edward J. Gurney; Representative Edward Hutchinson; Francis R. Kirkham, Esq.; Senator John L. McClellan; Judge Roger Robb; Bernard G. Segal, Esq.; Judge Alfred T.
Sulmonetti; Professor Herbert Wechsler; and Representative Charles E. Wiggins.
As Professor Thomas E. Baker has explained:
The docket problems of the Fifth Circuit first became a concern two decades before Congress moved to
divide [it] .... Between 1950 and the mid-1970s, the filings in the Fifth Circuit multiplied by a factor
of nine and "Congress simply could not add judges fast enough." The court survived by exceeding norms
of productivity and by implementing intramural procedural reforms that cumulatively transformed the
intermediate appellate court.
Responding to the urgings of Chief Justice Burger and others, Congress created the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, the so-called Hruska Commission. After extensive hearings, the Hruska Commission recommended in 1973 that Congress divide the Fifth Circuit and the Ninth
Circuit.
Professor Thomas E. Baker, On Redrawing Circuit Boundaries- Why the Proposal to Divide the United States
Court ofAppeals for the Ninth CircuitIs Not Such a Good Idea, 22 ARIz. ST. L.J. 917, 925 (1990) [hereinafter
Baker] (quoting Professor Thomas E. Baker, Precedent Times Three: Stare Decisis in the Divided Fifth Circuit, 35
Sw. L.J. 687, 697 (1981)) (other citations omitted).
59. See Baker, supr note 58, at 947 ("The 'add and divide' approach undermines important characteristics of
the federal intermediate appellate courts.").
60. STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES, supra note 50, at 114 (citing Judge John Minor Wisdom, Requiem fora Great
Court, 26 Loy. L. REV. 787 (1980)).
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States Court of Appeals for the Houston Metropolitan Area?"6 We think the inevitable result of circuit splitting is an unacceptable dilution of the federalizing,
contra-parochialism function of the federal courts of appeal.
We also think the deconstructionist, mani-circuit proposal will generate an unacceptably high level of inter-circuit conflicts -with the United States Supreme
Court being decreasingly able to reconcile these conflicts, given the practical limits of its review capabilities -and hence, an unacceptably high level of legal incoherence.
Moreover, or at any rate, this deconstructionist, mani-circuit "reform" proposal
is at best a "band-aid" "solution." The Fifth Circuit experience should have already
taught this lesson. "Congress divided the former Fifth Circuit essentially because
of its largeness - in geography, population, docket, and judgeships. Redrawing the
circuit boundaries, however, did absolutely nothing to relieve the press of the caseload."62 Indeed, the "new Fifth Circuit" reached its pre-division crisis level of filings in less than five years.3 And today, the "new Fifth Circuit" is the second
largest circuit in the land (just behind the Ninth Circuit). Meanwhile, the newly
created Eleventh Circuit, carved out of the old Fifth Circuit, has seen fit to take a
different, conservationist tack, which we think demonstrates prudence. In 1990,
the Eleventh Circuit deemed it necessary to pass a preemptory, "formal and unanimous resolution. . . asking Congress not to add any more circuit judgeships, despite [the existence of] statistical-caseload justifications" for such new
judgeships. 64 The Eleventh Circuit's resolution reflects the court's recognition that
new judgeships would grow that court too large to work effectively.6
C. The Merits andDemerits ofAdding Another
Layer ofAppellate Review
Another proposal, which has garnered some, but a significantly lesser degree
of support than the mega-circuit and mani-circuit proposals, is to add another
layer of federal appellate court structure -comprised of three district court judges
from within the circuit- with discretionary review available at the traditional circuit level regarding the decisions rendered by that, new-level panel. The decisions
rendered by these three-district-judge appellate panels would not have precedential value. This proposal is most similar to the appellate panel framework deployed

61 .Judge Thomas G. Gee, The Imminent Destructionof the Fifth Circuit;Or, How Not to Deal With a Blossoming Docket, 9 TEx. TECH L. REv. 799, 806 (1978).
62. Baker, supra note 58, at 927.
63. Fifth Circuit Clerk Gilbert Ganucheau, Remarks Before the Fifth Circuit Appellate Advocacy Seminar
(Oct. 18, 1984), in 2 FIFTH CIRCUIT REPORTER 301 (1985).
64. Baker, supra note 58, at 928.
65. See Baker, supra note 58, at 928 n.56 and accompanying text (citing Chief Judge Paul H. Roney, Remarks
Before the 1989 Judicial Conference of the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits (New Orleans, La., May 8, 1989); and
Letter From Chief Judge Paul H. Roney to L. Ralph Mecham, Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts (Mar. 2, 1989)).
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for some initial bankruptcy appeals in the Ninth Circuit -by virtue of the congressionally-authorized bankruptcy appellate panels (BAPs).66
We do regard this additional-appellate-level proposal as an improvement over
the mega-circuit and mani-circuit proposals, and we think it could work. But we
think this additional layer is unnecessarily inefficient in its growth orientation,
given the superior viability and efficiency of our proposal for discretionary review
at the traditional intermediate appellate court level.
II.

GENERAL ASPECTS OF FEDERAL COURT RESTORATION
AND CONSERVATION

In this part of the Article, we address the general aspects of, or necessary conditions for, a holistically reformed, and restored, federal court regime. In part IV,
we will address the most essential element of federal court restoration and conservation: differential appellate case management.
A. Efficiency at the FederalDistrictCourtLevel
We urge adoption of the Report's recommendation that the district court structure be reformed so that each often generalist circuits (i.e., not including the additional, specialized courts in the federal system like the Federal Circuit Court, the
Court of International Trade, the Court of Military Appeals, and the Court of
Veterans' Appeals) be comprised of but one district of geographical boundaries coterminous with the boundaries of their respective circuits.67 This restructuring of
the districts constitutes an important systemic efficiency measure: the structural
flexibility for district judges from all over the district to be sent where they are
most needed -to be sent to the places within these districts most in need of judgepower, from places within the districts experiencing a relatively less pressing need
for judge-power. This would be a more efficient use of trial judges than the "stay
put, need be or not," status quo district court structure.
Even with this federal district court reformation, however, significant pretrial
procedure (e.g., automatic disclosure), and especially, differential case management mechanisms (e.g., tracking and "ADR" techniques) are also needed in these
"entry-way," source-of-appeals, courts of the federal system- in order for the federal courts to manage caseloads through the entire system in a manner consistent

66. The BAPs in the Ninth Circuit are comprised of three, non-Article III, bankruptcy judges. The bankruptcy litigants in the Ninth Circuit have the choice of whether to submit their initial appeal to the BAP (comprised of bankruptcy judges from without the district from which the bankruptcy appeal is taken), or to a
generalist, Article III district courtjudge (of the district from which the bankruptcy appeal is taken). See generally
Gordon Bermant & Judy B. Sloan, BankruptcyAppellate Panels: The Ninth Circuit's Experience, 21 ARIz. ST.
L.J. 181 (1989). See also Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 104(c), (d), 108 Stat. 4106
(to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)) (providing for the establishment in each judicial circuit of a BAP, unless
the circuit judicial council finds there are insufficient judicial resources available in the circuit, or that the establishment of the BAP would result in undue delay or increased cost to the parties; and providing that all appeals
from bankruptcy courts in circuits establishing BAPs shall be heard by a bankruptcy appellate panel unless a
party makes a timely objection to have the appeal heard by a district court).
67. See COMMITTEE REPOrTr, supra note 7, at 12-13 (hereto attached as Appendix C, at 255).

MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 14:211

with the goal of distributing to each case, in a due, case-sensitive manner, the
amount of resources it needs .68
We think Senator Charles E. Grassley made some very good points in his recent
reprimand of the United States Judicial Conference relative to the institutional inconsistency in the Judiciary's position - i.e., criticizing Congress for creating new
burdens on the federal courts by creating more and more federal causes of action,
while at the same time preventing those in Congress who want to help relieve some
of those burdens (in the form of providing the federal district courts with additional "ADR" methods of resolving disputes) from doing so.6" As we have written
in another law review article about the necessary reform of civil dispute resolution
in the federal district courts in particular: "The much-needed, reformed system of
civil adjudication will require the deployment of a battery of dispute resolution
mechanisms."'
B. A Limited Appellate Court Structure
Further, for the reasons we have already addressed, we regard the appellate
court restructuring recommendations contained in the Report to be necessary prerequisites to federal court restoration and conservation: (1) there should be ten
generalist circuits; each comprised of one court of appeals (and one district court,
as discussed above); and (2) each circuit court should have twelve judges.71
C. Fundamentals-Focused,JurisdictionalRestraint
We have discussed the Report's conclusion, with which we agree, that the federal court system must consist of a limited number of judgeships if it is to remain
true to the governmental principle of well-balanced federalism and to the value of
quality adjudication of society's most important and complex legal issues. A federal court system limited in size will certainly need its courts to be models of effective case management. No matter what structural and procedural reforms might be
made to the federal courts, these will be inadequate to truly restore and conserve

68. See generally Parker & Hagin, supra note 4. See also Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, "Civil Justice System
Improvements," Remarks Before the American Bar Association, at 11(Dec. 14, 1993) (transcript on file with the
MississippiCollege Law Review) ("To begin with, I think we can find broad agreement on the need to create what
has been called the multi-door courthouse.") (citations omitted); see also William H. Rehnquist, ChiefJustice's
1993 Year-End Report, THE THIRD BRANCH (Admin. Office of the United States Courts, Washington, D.C.), Jan.
1994, 1, at 3 (recognizing that, "[in 1993,] Congress and the courts made an effort at creative reform with the
consideration and passage of several initiatives. These included adoption of the rules of procedure amendment
package, which embodied new ways of managing discovery, and the extension of authorization for pilot arbitration programs.").
69. Senator Charles E. Grassley, Remarks Before the Judicial Conference of the United States (Mar. 15, 1994)
(transcript on file with the Mississippi College Law Review) (Senator Grassley criticized the Judicial Conference
for opposing even the extension of the mandatory, non-binding arbitration device for cases involving less than
$150,000 to all federal district courts, for use in the courts' discretion, when the mandatory arbitration program
in fact helps with "precisely the problem for which [the federal courts] rightly criticize the Congress-heaping
more responsibility [on the courts]. Arbitration will remove some cases from your docket and get them resolved
more quickly and efficiently."). See also Parker & Hagin, supra note 4.
70. Parker & Hagin, supra note 4, at 1911.
71. COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 7, at 9-10 (hereto attached as Appendix C, at 253-54).
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the federal courts for any significant period of time unless jurisdictional priorities
are addressed in a manner reflective of fair and reasonable restraint.
The courts of appeal have very successfully utilized case management techniques that have over the past thirty years increased the average case disposition
rate from 64.2 to 284.2 per judge. 72 These techniques include: the screening of
cases for appropriate routing-to the oral argument or the summary disposition
circuit calendar; 7 3 the utilization of local rules that permit summary affirmance on
the basis of the district court's decision;74 and the utilization of circuit staff counsel
to prepare and submit groups of cases to a panel for disposition.7" And, to a lesser
extent, circuit-level pre-argument, or settlement conferences have had a positive
impact. 76 We think the courts have stretched these appellate case management
techniques to the point of exhausting their ability to render any additional significant contributions to the federal dispute resolution system.77

72. See infra app. B.
73. See, e.g., 5TH CIR. R. 34 I.O.P.:
-Screening- Screening is the name given to the method used by the Court to determine whether
cases should be orally argued or decided on briefs only. This is done under FRAP 34, supplemented as above [by Local Fifth Circuit Rule 34].
Screening is performed by judges of the Court with assistance from the Office of Staff Attorney. When the last brief is filed, a case is sent to the Office of Staff Attorney for prescreening
classification.
Decision Without Oral Argument-When all panel members agree that oral argument of a case is
not needed, the Clerk is advised that the case has been placed on the summary calendar.
74. See, e.g., 5TH CIR. R. 47.6:
When the Court determines that any one or more of the following circumstances exists and is dispositive of a matter submitted to the Court for decision: (1)that a judgment of the District Court
is based on findings of fact which are not clearly erroneous, (2) that the evidence in support of a
jury verdict is not insufficient, (3) that the order ofan administrative agency is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, or (4) in the case of a summary judgment, that no genuine issue of material fact has been properly raised by the appellant, and the Court also
determines that no reversible error of law appears and an opinion would have no precedential
value, the judgment or order may be affirmed or enforced without opinion.
In such case, the Court may in its discretion enter either of the following orders: "AFFIRMED.
See Loc.R. 47.6." or "ENFORCED. See Loc.R. 47.6."
See NLRB v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers of Am., 430 F.2d 966 (5th Cir. 1970).
75. See generally STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES, supra note 50, at 129 (citing Professor John B. Oakley, The
Screening ofAppeals: The Ninth CircuitsExperience in the Eightiesand Innovationsfor the Nineties, 1991 B.Y.U.
L. REV.859).
76. See generally FED. R. App. P. 33 ("The court may direct the attorneys for the parties to appear before the
court or a judge thereof fora prehearing conference to consider the simplification of the issues and such other
matters as may aid in the disposition of the proceeding by the court."). See also STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES, supra note 50, at 40-42, and authorities cited therein on appeal diversion programs.
77. As the Chief of the Long Range Planning Office of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts,
Charles W. Nihan, has put it:
[C]ircuit judges complete far more work today, and complete it with equal dispatch, as they did in prior
years. Indeed, if efficiency can be defined as the amount of work completed, then circuit judges have
become steadily more efficient from 1960 to 1992. There is every reason to expect that this trend will
continue in the short term but, eventually, circuit judges will be presented with a clear choice: (1)continue to dispose of more cases by changing fundamentally the nature of appellate review, (2) dispose of a
steady number of cases and either let the backlog build or substantially increase the number of authorized
circuit judgeships, or (3) adopt discretionary review.
Nihan-Parker Memorandum, supra note 1.See also infra apps. A, B, and D.
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We think it is critical that Congress also exercise and sustain a measure of principled jurisdictional restraint. We submit that such fair and well-reasoned legislative (first branch) restraint is every bit as critical to a viable, well-balanced
constitutional system of law as fair, well-reasoned, judicial (third branch) restraint. Much of the incessant growth suffered by the federal courts- felt (through
a case "snowball"-like effect) most acutely at the intermediate appellate court
level- is the result of an apparent modern congressional affinity for "resolving"
every social concern by creating a new federal cause of action and "placing" the
problem with the federal courts. We think this penchant has grown to the point of
threatening the overthrow of federalism.
As Fifth Circuit Judge Carolyn Dineen King has explained:
The primary reason [for the federal courts' present crunch of caseload explosion] is
legislation which began in earnest in the 1960s. Congress decided that the cure for
many things that ail us is federal legislation -creating rights and entitlements and
providing the [federal court] mechanism to enforce or obtain them. It would serve
no useful purpose for me to evaluate in the abstract whether the new rights and entitlements have served the country well -clearly some have, and undoubtedly some
have not. 78
Meaningful federal court reform requires separating the federal case "wheat" from
the "chaff'- giving back to the state courts the power to resolve those conflicts localized within the particular states which they are willing and able to handle, as
well as vigorously supportingstate efforts to resolve the localized problems of law
they encounter (for example, by increasing joint legal research and financing ven-

78. King, supra note 2, at 956. See also Representative Jack Brooks, Remarks Before the Federal Judges Association (May 19, 1993) (transcript on file with the Mississippi College Law Review):
One of the most disquieting aspects of our political debate over the past several years has been the willingness of some - when faced with serious and complex problems that have proved intractable at the state
and local level- to decree a "solution" by elevating the matter to a federal offense.
See also Congress Focuses on Cost of Crime, THE THIRD BRANCH (Admin. Office of the United States Courts,
Washington, D.C.), Mar. 1994, at 5 (quoting Senator Ernest Hollings, Chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, The Judiciary, and Related Agencies: "We try to federalize
every crime up here."); id. ("Hollings said that the debate over crime has become so highly politicized that he
believes he could get the Senate to vote in favor of federalizing virtually any crime. 'It's gotten silly around this
town,' Hollings said."); William H. Rehnquist, ChiefJustice's 1993 Year-End Report, THE THIRD BRANCH (Admin. Office of the United States Courts, Washington, D.C.), Jan. 1994, 1, at 3:
Recent [legislative] action on a crime bill also reflected a natural response to growing concerns about
crime. Unfortunately, proposed legislative responses have expanded-unwisely, in my view-the role of
the federal courts in the administration of criminal justice. The federal courts undoubtedly have an important part to play in the war against crime, but I urge Congress to review carefully the impact on the
federal courts, and on the traditional balance between state and federal jurisdiction, before adopting the
more expansive proposals in the crime bill.
Compare United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding the Gun-Free School Zones Act invalid as
beyond the bounds of the Commerce Clause), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 1536 (1994) with United States v.
Edwards, 13 F3d 291 (9th Cir. 1993) (disagreeing with the Lopez court's Commerce Clause construction).
Comparealso United States v. Cortner, 834 F Supp. 242 (M.D. Tenn. 1993) (holding the Anti Car Theft Act,
carjacking" legislation invalid as beyond the bounds of the Commerce Clause) with United States v. Johnson, 22
F.3d 106 (6th Cir. 1994) (explaining and holding that while the Cortnerdistrict court may be right in viewing the
carjacking" statute as unwise and inconsistent with traditional notions of federalism, the statute is "not unconstitutional under current Commerce Clause doctrine").

1994l

FEDERAL COURTS AT THE CROSSROADS: ADAPT OR LOSE!

tures with the states).T' Such restored balance between the state and federal legislative and judicial systems is not simply necessary to the ability of the federal
courts to work in a quality-consistent manner, as a volumetric matter. Such renewal is also crucial to the preservation of the fundamental governmental value of
well-balanced federalism- with the federal courts being courts of essentially limited jurisdiction and the state courts being courts of general jurisdiction; nothing
less than an overriding principle of our system of government under law."8 For example, Resolution IX, adopted in February, 1994, by the Conference of (state)
Chief Justices, announced the Conference's position that some provisions of the
most recent national crime bill, if enacted, "would amount in the indiscriminate
federalization of crimes, the needless disruption of effective state and local enforcement efforts, and the inefficient use of the special but limited resources of the
federal courts"-all in contravention of the principle of federalism."'

79. See, e.g., THE FEDERAUST No. 45, at 292 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("The powers
delegated by the proposed Constitution to the Federal Government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State Governments are numerous and indefinite."). See also Congress Focuses on Cost of Crime, THE
THIRD BRANCH (Admin. Office of the United States Courts, Washington, D.C.), Mar. 1994, at 5 (quoting Justice
Anthony M. Kennedy's recent testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies):
[Justice] Kennedy expressed special concern about the impact of death penalty cases on the courts of
appeals. "Ifyou have 50 or 60 federal death penalty crimes, you simply are going to block the courts of
appeals of this country from being able to address other important issues for years while they digest, define, and understand these new criminal provisions," he said. Kennedy suggested instead of adding to the
federal courts' criminal jurisdiction, that Congress provide additional support and resources to the states.
See also id. (quoting Second Circuit Judge John M. Walker Jr.'s recent testimony before the same subcommittee:
"It seems to me that the states are capable of doing a good job. We should explore ways of strengthening state
systems.").
80. "As every schoolchild learns, our Constitution establishes a system of dual sovereignty between the States
and the Federal Government." Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991) (O'Connor, J.). And the democratic principles underlying this scheme of dual sovereignty-power remain cogent. See generally Professor Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clauseand State Autonomy: Federalismfor a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 4-10 (1988) (citations omitted) [hereinafter Merritt]:
Contemporary thinkers identify at least four positive features of our federal system. . . .[First,] [a] dual
system of government checks abuses of power in any branch of the system. [Second,] [sitate and local
governments increase the opportunities for citizens to participate actively in the democratic process and
[third,] create diverse cultural and political environments. Finally, the distribution of power among fiftyone different governments enhances opportunities forinnovation and experimentation.
See generally also id. at 9 (noting in particular, with respect to the experimentation value of federalism, that "[u]nemployment compensation, minimum-wage laws, public financing of political campaigns, no-fault insurance,
hospital cost containment, and prohibitions against discrimination in housing and employment all originated in
state legislatures").
81. See CongressionalCrimeLegislation: Violent Crime ControlandLaw EnforcementAct of1994, Conference
of Chief Justices, Res. IX (Feb. 10, 1994) [hereinafter Resolution IX] (on file with the MississippiCollege Law
Review):
[T]he Conference of [state court] Chief Justices[ ] strongly believes that the problems of crime in our nation must be addressed in a meaningful way to provide resources and reinforcement for the efforts of state
judicial, legislative and executive leaders to address the problems of crime in their jurisdictions; strongly
opposes federal action which, contrary to the principles of federalism and historical experience, would
have the pernicious effect of federalizing State criminal law and procedures; and strongly opposes provisions of the proposed legislation which would require that the limited resources of the federal courts be
expended in the prosecution and trial of ordinary street crimes, to the exclusion of interstate crime syndicates, corruption in public office, the vindication of individual constitutional rights and other traditional
federal issues.
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The commitment to federalism is important, as Justice Brandeis well recognized:
There must be power in the States and the Nation to remould, through experimentation, our economic practices and institutions to meet changing social and economic needs. .

.

. To stay experimentation in things social and economic is a grave

the right to experiment may be fraught with serious conseresponsibility. Denial of
82
quences to the Nation.
Or, as Justice Black later put it, the reason for restraining federal courts from interfering with state proceedings is reinforced by the vital consideration of "comity,"
that is:
[A] proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire
country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance
of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their
institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways.
This, perhaps for lack of a better and clearer way to describe it, is referred to by
many as "Our Federalism[.]" ... It should never be forgotten that this slogan, "Our
Federalism," born in the early struggling days of our Union83of States, occupies a
highly important place in our Nation's history and its future.
In short, we are in basic agreement with Judge Reinhardt's statement to the Chairs
of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, Representative Brooks and Senator Biden, that "[tihere are changes that could be made in several areas in our [federal court] jurisdiction that would be helpful."84 But we think these changes in
jurisdiction are essential, not simply helpful; and we regard them as imminently
practical, and not, as Judge Reinhardt thinks, "impractical.""
We are unwilling to join in Judge Reinhardt's "assumption" that Congress will
not be willing to make the necessary changes in its jurisdictional practices "to assist in ensuring fairness and justice in our federal courts, and permit the more orderly and efficient administration of the justice system."86 We indeed harbor hope
that Congress and the Judiciary will work well together toward the paramount national objectives of restoring and conserving our federal court resources. We are
encouraged by the important, well-informed and Judiciary-sensitive work by
leaders in both parties and on both sides of the Hill -such as Representatives
Brooks, Edwards, and Hughes; and Senators Biden, Grassley, Heflin, and
82. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Compare Resolution IX, supra note 81 ("[T]he command of the 10th Amendment encourages each state to serve as a laboratory
for development of legal remedies and principles in criminal and civil law, without intrusion of federal authority.").
83. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-45 (1971) (Black, J.) (emphasis added).
84. Reinhardt, supra note 3, at 53:
I refer particularly to the flooding of the federal courts with run-of-the-mill narcotics cases that should
more properly be handled in our state system. I also refer to the problems created by the recent adoption
of sentencing guidelines and, even more so, by mandatory minimum sentences, which are often wholly
inappropriate and frequently lead to unnecessary trials and appeals.
85. Reinhardt, supra note 3, at 53.
86. Reinhardt, supra note 3, at 53.
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Hollings. Congress has been at the forefront in bringing the critically-important
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 to bear on the problems of civil litigation costs
and delay in the federal district courts. The development of Judicial Impact Statements as part of the materials considered relative to jurisdictional legislative proposals represents another step in the right direction-toward the making of
consistently principled distributions of limited federal court resources.87 We are
encouraged by recent yeoman efforts by the executive branch, as well. 88 Yet, the
courts are still in need of much more actual reform.
We think Congress must re-evaluate the "federal" crimes and causes of action
currently on the books, and any proposed new "federal" crimes and causes of
action, by a set of principles, or guidelines, like those called for by Senate Judiciary Committee Chair, Joseph R. Biden, Jr., last year in his remarks before the
Third Circuit Judicial Conference. With foresight reminiscent of the keen vision
he displayed with respect to the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Senator Biden
has set the appropriate agenda for much-needed legislative (jurisdictional) restraint:
What we need is a principle means of evaluating proposed legislation. The first
task is to identify what principles should properly fuel any proposal to change federal
court jurisdiction. How then can we identify those cases that have the strongest
claim to federal jurisdiction in a principled manner?
The real question is, in my view, given the practical limits of federal court resources, what cases are of the highest priority? What cases have the very strongest

87. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, ACTIVITIES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
CouRTs 23-24 (1993):
In this current period of serious economic and fiscal constraints, making sure that members of Congress and representatives from the executive branch remain fully aware of the consequences their proposals and initiatives may have on the operations and budget of the federal judiciary has become more
important than ever. During the past fiscal year, judicial impact statements were prepared on a broad array of legislative proposals, enacted legislation, and executive branch initiatives including the Violence
Against Women Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, and the Court Arbitration Authorization Act.
There were also numerous instances when legislation was placed on a "fast track" and the judiciary was
strongly urged to provide an immediate response on the potential costs. In reaction to these requests, a
"preliminary impact assessment" format was developed that presents a modified and condensed cost-estimate analysis. These preliminary impact statements ensure that an assessment of the impact a piece of
legislation will have on the judiciary becomes a part of the record at a crucial point in the legislative
process.
See also Crime Bill Elicits Strong Reactions From Diverse Groups, THE THIRD BRANCH (Admin. Office of the
United States Courts, Washington, D.C.), Mar. 1994, at 4 ("In response to a request from Representatives Don
Edwards (D-Calif.) and William J. Hughes (D-N.J.), the U.S. Sentencing Commission submitted its analysis of
how the Senate crime bill would affect sentencing guidelines.").
88. See Leaders of Three BranchesParticipatein RoundtableDiscussions, THE THIRD BRANCH (Admin. Office
of the United States Courts, Washington, D.C.), Apr. 1994, at 5:
A unique Three-Branch Roundtable on State and Federal Jurisdiction was held in Washington, D.C., on
March 7, 1994, under the auspices of the Office of the Attorney General. The roundtable participants,
who represented the three branches of federal government, state government, and academe explored their
overlapping and separate spheres as they apply to state and federal jurisdiction. ...
Roundtable discussion focused on the effect federalization of state civil and criminal law has on the justice system, the mission of the federal Judiciary, the principles used when considering the federalization
of state law, and the mechanisms that exist or should exist for federal-state cooperation. . ..
As a result of these discussions, working [exploration] groups were formed.
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claim on the federal courts? It seems to me we must be careful to make the right
choices. 89

We think Senator Biden has well-described the need for a vigorous inter-branch
and multi-faceted commitment to federal court problem-solving, and in particular,
for a renewed sense of federalism and federal court conservation in the realm of
jurisdictional legislating. Further, though, in order to ensure that thejurisdictional
guidelines are not manipulated out of actual legislative existence, but rather, are
indeed enforced (and remain in force), we submit that Congress must give these
jurisdictional guidelines the "teeth" of a "give-to-get" mechanism representative of
a real, unwavering congressional commitment to federalism and quality adjudication in the federal courts. In brief, we urge Congress to adopt fundamental guidelines like those we discuss next, and to tie its jurisdictional legislative actions to
the reality of a limited federal court resource, so that "[w]hen the sun rises on new
causes of action, it must set on some old ones." 90
D. ProposedJurisdictionalGuidelines:
FederalCourt Fundamentals

Historically, fairly, and efficiently, the federal courts have reflected the intent of
the Constitutional Framers to provide for a judicial forum that would perform distinctive tasks arising out of our special governmental structure - tasks not ordinarily appropriate under that structure for the state courts. The public looks to the
Federal Judiciary for the performance of several discrete but critical tasks. We regard the following to be the fundamental principles (Federal Court Fundamentals)
reflected in this country's conception offederal courts:
1. It is expected that federal courts will (a) safeguard(b) significant, (c) national
interests, (d) in needof national safeguarding.
2. It is expected that federal courts will withstand purely parochial influences.

89. Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., Remarks Before the Judicial Conference of the Third Circuit, at 22, 33 (Apr.
19, 1993) (transcript on file with the Mississippi College Law Review). See also Judge Charles Clark, Essay, Mules
and Wagons-A Pleafor JurisdictionalReform, 14 Miss. C. L. REv. 263 (1994):
Congress has used its plenary power time after time to put more and more jurisdictional loads on and add
more and more judges and support staff to the federal court system. For over 100 years, this has been
done without any effort to develop a clear policy for governing a federal judicial system that ought to be
designed to serve federal needs.
As we have noted:
The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA) represents a necessary first step toward making our system
of civil dispute resolution responsive to the needs of the people who use and support it: the taxpayers.
Credit should go where credit is due. Senator Joe Biden, with single-minded determination, secured passage of this controversial legislation.
Parker & Hagin, supra note 4, at 1930-31 (citing Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482
(Supp. III 1991) (enacted as Title I of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650 § 103(a), 104
Stat. 5090-96 (1990))) (other citations omitted). The great American philosopher, Mark Twain, taught: Even if
you are on the right track, you'll get run over if you just sit there. So we are especially encouraged by Senator
Biden's efforts to keep the courts moving-on the right track, toward true, systemic, federal court reform.
90. COMMITTEE REPRr, supra note 7, at 8 (hereto attached as Appendix C, at 253).
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3. It is expected that federal courts will protect from state infringement those (a)
fundamental, (b) civil rights by which the character of a free people is defined.
4. It is expected that federal courts will protect from state infringement those (a)
fundamental, (b) civil liberties by which the character of a free people is defined.

And we are convinced that these basic federal court principles are being everincreasingly subverted by the current transformation of the federal courts (of supposedly limited jurisdiction) into an incessantly-expanding, large, all-purposive
institution.91

We submit that all federal jurisdictional legislation must be carefully considered according to the four sets of Federal Court Fundamentals identified above.
We propose that these Federal Court Fundamentals be used as guidelines by
Congress -as a tool by which to measure whether current or proposed "federal"
crimes and causes of action should be kept or placed in the federal courts, or
rather, whether they should be "sunsetted" or forgotten, respectively, as appropriate subjects of federal jurisdiction. For example, we think it becomes clear upon
such analysis that the general diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts does not
measure up. While some case-affecting, state-against-state bias may linger, such
bias is surely not such as to justify the irrebuttable presumption of it reflected in
the current, essentially blanket diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts.92 We
submit that this type of'jurisdiction should at least be limited to the following types
of cases: (1) those in which the party seeking to invoke such jurisdiction actually
demonstrates that case-affecting, state-against-state prejudice, or local parochial
influence against the diversity-seeking litigant or those substantially similar to the

91. See generallyJudge J. Harvie Wilkinson, III, The Drawbacks of Growth in the FederalJudiciary,43 EMORY
L.J. (forthcoming Fall 1994).
92. One study found fear of local bias against a nonresident litigant to be a factor in the decision to seek a
federal forum through the device of diversity jurisdiction in only 4.3 % of the cases so taken to the federal courthouse. Professor Marvin R. Summers, Analysis of Factors That Influence Choice of Forum in Diversity Cases, 47
IOWA L. RaV. 933,937-38 (1962). See also Judge Dolores K. Sloviter, A FederalJudgeViews DiversityJurisdiction
Through the Lens of Federalism, 78 VA. L. REv. 1671, 1687 (1992) (citation omitted):
When federal judges make state law ... judges who are not selected under the state's system and who
are not answerable to its constituency are undertaking an inherent state court function ....
[Tihere is no
longer any valid basis to justify the fundamental incompatibility of diversity jurisdiction with the most
basic principles of federalism.

MISSISSIPPI COLLEGELA WREVIEW

[Vol. 14:211

litigant, exists;93 and (2) instances of complex, multi-state, diversity litigation.94
We think state prisoner civil rights filings constitute another ready example of
cases falling without the federal courts' appropriate jurisdiction. Under our proposed Federal Court Fundamentals, especially under Fundamental One, these filings are shown to offend the principle that the federal courts should concern
themselves with only the significant, national interests entrusted to them by Congress which are in need of federal court safeguarding. There is no reason to presume the states are incapable of safeguarding or disinclined to safeguard the rights
of their prisoners. The supercilious presence of the federal courts in this area,
also, is unwarranted, unwise, and undermining of federalism.95 We think other
immediately obvious examples of "federal" jurisdiction qualifying for divestiture
from the federal courts under a Federal Court Fundamentals-type analysis are:
Jones Act jurisdiction;9 6 and student loan jurisdiction. But we are sure many more
"federal" crimes and causes of action would be found wanting if viewed under a
lamp like our proposed Federal Court Fundamentals.

93. "Such provisions, dating back to the Act of March 2, 1867, 14 Stat. 558, were eliminated as 'unnecessary'
in the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code." CHARLES ALAN

WRIGHT,

LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 129 n. 11 (4th ed.

1983).
94. See, e.g., FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT
OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 38-43 (1990) [hereinafter FCSC REPORT] ("After extensive discus-

sion, a substantialmajority of the committee strongly recommends that Congress eliminate this basis of federal
jurisdiction, subject to certain narrowly defined exceptions [such as complex multi-state litigation]."). "Responding to mounting public and professional concern with the federal courts' congestion, delay, expense, and expansion, this committee" was "appointed by [ ] Chief Justice [Rehnquist] at the direction of Congress." See Judicial
Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642 (effective Jan. 1, 1989).
Specifically, the Federal Courts Study Committee was directed to "examine problems and issues currently facing
the courts of the United States" and to "develop a long-range plan for the future of the federal judiciary." Id. §
102(b)(l)-(2).
The Study Committee conducted a fifteen-month study of the problems confronting the federal courts and presented a report of its analysis and recommendations. The Committee was chaired by Third Circuit Judge Joseph
F. Weis, Jr., and. its members were: J. Vincent Aprile II, Esq.; United States District Court Judge Jose A. Cabranes; Washington State Supreme Court Justice Keith M. Callow; First Circuit Judge Levin H. Campbell;
Edward S. G. Dennis, Jr., Esq.; Senator Charles E. Grassley; Morris Harrell, Esq.; Senator Howell Heflin; Representative Robert W. Kastenmeier; United States District Court Judge Judith N. Keep; Brigham Young University President Rex E. Lee, Jr.; Representative Carlos J. Moorhead; Diana Gribbon Motz, Esq.; and Seventh
Circuit Judge Richard A. Posner. William K. Slate II, Esq., served as Director of the Federal Courts Study Committee. Steven G. Gallagher, Esq., served as Counsel to the Committee. Others who served as Committee Staff
or Reporters were: Professor Thomas E. Baker; Professor Sara S. Beale; Diana G. Culp, Esq.; Denis J. Hauptly,
Esq.; Professor Larry B. Kramer; Professor Richard L. Marcus; Professor Thomas D. Rowe, Jr.; and Doctor
Russell R. Wheeler.
95. See, e.g., FCSC REPORT, supra note 94, at 48-50 ((1) recommending that Congress (a) amend 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e to direct federal courts in state prisoner suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to require exhaustion of
state institutional remedies for a period of 120 days, if the court or the Attorney General of the United States is
satisfied that the remedies are fair and effective, and (b) delete 1997e(b)'s minimal standards for state institutional remedies; and (2) noting that exhaustion is required beforefederal prisoners may file civil rights cases in
the federal courts, and it has not proved an onerous burden on such prisoners even though there is no time limit
for the Bureau of Prisons to act on prisoners' claims, as there would be under the Federal Courts Study Committee's proposal relative to state prisoners).
96. See, e.g., FCSC REPORT, supra note 94, at 63 (recommending that Congress repeal the Jones Act of 1920
because it has essentially outlived its need: "The Jones Act. . . supplements the seamen's traditional actions for
maintenance and cure and for the breach of unseaworthiness. Congress has since 1920 created a federal workers'
compensation scheme in the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. We recommend that Congress
amend it to include seamen.").
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IV. THE REFORMATION ESSENTIAL
OF A DIFFERENTIAL APPELLATE CASE MANAGEMENT MECHANISM
Finally, the cornerstone of systemic federal court reform is the introduction at
the intermediate appellate level of the sort of differential case management tool we
discussed at the outset -essentially, the two-track methodology recommended in
the Report.9 7 This sort of device will allow the courts of appeal the critical ability
to more fairly and effectively distinguish between those cases in need of the appellate court's plenary review and those not in need of such circuit court attention. As
Third Circuit Judge Joseph F. Weis, Jr. has put it:
What we should keep in mind is that there are two separate functions of the appellate
court, the error-correcting function and the law-giving function. They do not always
deserve the same treatment.
Some of our problems are created by the fact that we now treat all appeals in the
same way. Perhaps we need to be more discriminating in our procedures.98

We think, though, that there is now no "perhaps" about the need for the courts of
appeal to be more discriminating in their review procedures.
Discretionary review at the court of appeals level will restore an important institutional balance between the district and intermediate appellate courts. As
Professor Charles Alan Wright, among others, has long been trying to teach: The
"federal appellate courts ha[ve] assumed too many of the functions previously performed by the trial. courts," and thereby, "appellate judges have been guilty in a
sense of shooting themselves in the foot;" as, "[h]aving taken on these tasks," the
appellate courts soon found themselves overloaded with work.99 We think the introduction of the Report's recommended two-track, differential appellate case

97. See supra notes 14-31 and accompanying text. See also COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 7, at 10-12 (hereto
attached as Appendix C, at 253-55). As we have discussed, however, while we urge adoption of the two-track
mechanism recommended by the Committee's Report, we also think this mechanism will need to still further
evolve in the near future into a "pure" discretionary review procedural device.
98. Weis, supra note 11, at 99.
99. Weis, supra note 11, at 97 (citing Professor Charles Alan Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience ofAppellate
Courts, 41 MINN. L. REv. 751 (1957) [hereinafter Wright]). See Wright, supra, at 75 1:
The principal means by which appellate courts have obtained such complete control of litigation has
been the transmutation of specific circumstances into questions of law. Subtle rules about presumptions
and burden of proof, elaborate concepts of causation and consideration and the rest, have been devised in
such a way that unless the appellate judge handling the case is a dullard, some doctrine is always at hand to
achieve the ends ofjustice, as they appear to the appellate court.
See also LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 380 (1930):
Probably the strangest chapter in American legal history is how in the short period of the last fifty or seventy-five years, the same period during which trial courts were losing most of their power, the appellate
courts have drawn unto themselves practically all the power of the judicial system.
Judge Stanley Sporkin of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia recently captured this
vision of necessary intra-branch, institutional balance especially well:
In most cases it would seem that the role of the appellate judge is to determine whether the litigants have
received a fair trial and whether the results comport with the law. A trial need not be perfect, nor in my
view need the relief ordered be that which the reviewing judge would have decreed had that judge tried
the case. What really should be strived for is a determination whether the lower court decision falls
within the range of acceptable limits.
Judge Stanley Sporkin, Reforming the FederalJudiciary, 46 SMU L. REv. 751, 759 (1992).
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management mechanism can perform the necessary recalibration of the appellate
court/district court division of adjudicative tasks.
V. WHAT IF JUDGE REINHARDT IS RIGHT ABOUT
THE LACK OF LEGISLATIVE (JURISDICTIONAL) RESTRAINT?:
INHERENT JUDICIAL POWERS-PLANS OF ACTION

What if Judge Reinhardt is right? What if he is right in his "assumption" that
Congress will not be willing to exercise restraint in its jurisdictional legislating?..
If Judge Reinhardt is proved right, we think the fundamental character of the
federal courts and the constitutional structure of government will be so threatened
that the Judiciary will have no choice but to institute some necessary reform measures on its own, through its inherent powers as a coordinate, judicial, branch of
the national government. Such measures would certainly be much less effective
than the true, systemic reform congressional action could achieve. For example,
there really is not anything the Judiciary can do through its inherent powers to restructure the district and circuit courts. Still, the federal courts can, we think,
make some meaningful strides toward necessary reform by drawing upon their
powers of judicial independence -powers essential to their functioning as federal
courts- in the areas of: (1) federal court jurisdiction; and (2) especially, differential appellate case management.
As Justice White explained for the Supreme Court in the 1991, Chambers v.
Nasco, Inc. decision:
It has long been understood that "[c]ertain implied powers must necessarily result
to our Courts of justice from the nature of their institution," powers "which cannot
be dispensed with in a Court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all
others." ... These powers are "governed not by rule or statute but by the control

100. Reinhardt, supra note 3, at 53 ("I assume that Congress will not be willing to make [the helpful] changes in
those [available] areas to assist in ensuring fairness and justice in our federal courts, and permit the more orderly
and efficient administration of the justice system.").
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necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly
and expeditious disposition of cases."10 1

We think it is obvious, especially in an age of apparently incessant quantitative demands upon the federal courts, that the inherent powers of the courts include the
power necessary to protect themselves, "to [effectively] administer justice, to
promulgate rules for practice," and "to provide [fair] process where none [effectively] exists."' 2 The federal courts also possess the power and the obligation to

101. Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (White, J.) (quoting United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S.
(7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812) (Johnson, J.); and Link v. Wabash Ry. Co., 370 U.S. 626,630-31 (1962) (Harlan, J.)).
See also Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 57-58 (1982) (Brennan, J.)
(emphasizing the fact that the Constitution establishes an independent judicial branch, and that our nation's tripartite, constitutional scheme of government is maintained by a system of checks and balances that serves "'as
a self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the
other.'") (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (per curiam)); see also id. at 58 ("As an inseparable
element of the constitutional system of checks and balances, and as a guarantee of judicial impartiality, Art. III
both defines the power and protects the independence of the Judicial branch."); see also id. at 64 n. 15 ("[Tlhe
Framers did not leave it to Congress to define the character of [the lower federal] courts -they were to be independent of the political branches and presided over by judges with guaranteed salary and life tenure."); see also
Exparte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920) (Brandeis, J.) ("Courts have (at least in the absence of legislation to
the contrary) inherent power to provide themselves with appropriate instruments required for the performance of
their duties."). Indeed, we think various congressional directives to the Judiciary recognize, at least implicitly or
effectively, the structural, inherent-power necessity of federal court "abstention" from the indiscriminate exercise
of excessive congressional creations of federal court jurisdiction. See, e.g., Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28
U.S.C. § 471 (aiming to "facilitate deliberate adjudication of civil cases on the merits, monitor discovery, improve litigation management, and ensurejust, speedy, and inexpensive resolutions of civil disputes") (emphasis
added). See also, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. I ("[These Rules] shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.") (emphasis added). Compare United States v. Bowe, 698 F2d 560, 566
(2d Cir. 1983) (quoting Kovarik v. County of Banner, 224 N.W.2d 761, 763 (Neb. 1975)) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added):
We do not believe ... that the Criminal Justice Act repeals or displaces a court's "inherent authority to do
those things reasonably necessary for the administration of justice in the exercise of [its] jurisdiction,"
including the power to appoint counsel to represent indigents. The Criminal Justice Act simply supplements this inherent power by providing for the compensation of counsel for what had previously been
gratuitous service.
102. See, e.g., Professor Linda S. Mullenix, UnconstitutionalRulemaking: The Civil Justice Reform Act and
Separationof Powers, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1283, 1298 (1993) [hereinafter Mullenix] ("The inherent powers of the
courts ... include the powers of the judiciary to protect itself, to administerjustice, to promulgate rules for practice, and to provide process where none exists.").
While we agree with much of what Professor Mullenix has written in UnconstitutionalRulemaking, we disagree
with her ultimate conclusion(s). That is, while we might agree that "[tlhe Civil Justice Reform Act represents a
rare example of Congress involving itself deeply in the internal operations of the federal judiciary," id., we do not
regard this as evidence that the Act is "constitutionally defective." Id. at 1309- 10. Indeed, we call here and elsewhere for more congressional measures of the type represented by the Civil Justice Reform Act -as the most
effective means of ensuring the continued effective performance by the third branch of its traditional, inherent
functions. See supra part III.C. (regarding the need for legislative (jurisdictional) restraint and a proposed Federal Court Fundamentals test for appropriate measures offederal court jurisdiction); supra part IV. (regarding the
federal court reform imperative of a differential appellate case management procedural regime); Parker & Hagin,
supra note 4, at 1930-33.
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check against the thwarting of constitutional limits by the legislative and executive
branches of the national government."'
A. An Inherent JudicialPowers-Plan
for JurisdictionalRestraint
If Judge Reinhardt is right about the unwillingness of Congress to make significant reforms in its jurisdictional legislative practices, the federal courts may have
to make do by drawing upon their own powers to preserve the overriding governmental principle of federalism and the value of quality adjudication. Fundamentally-balanced federalism requires that federal courts wield their powers with a
sensitivity to the impact on the constitutional balance of power between the national system of government and the state systems of government. 04 This conception of federalism has spawned myriad federal court decisions: (1) announcing
doctrines such as the doctrine of equitable abstention formulated in Younger v.
Harris, the "abstention doctrines" formulated through Supreme Court cases,"'5
and the "Eriedoctrine" formulated in the Supreme Court case, Erie RailroadCo. v.
Tompkins; 06 or (2) interpreting rules such as the Eleventh Amendment and the
Anti-Injunction Act, which govern the relationship between the federal courts and
the states." 0 7 And so, while the "general rule" (rhetorically, anyway) is that

103. See, e.g., Merritt, supra note 80, at 18-19:
Permitting a majority of Congress to override constitutional limits on state autonomy . . . disregards
the express language of Article V. Under that provision, changes in the constitutional balance of powers
may be achieved only by a constitutional amendment garnering support from two-thirds of the members
of Congress, as well as three-fourths of the states. A bare majority of Congress is never sufficient to
amend the Constitution.
See also id. at 20 ("The Constitution requires the courts to set aside legislation violating express constitutional
commands. If the Constitution forbids federal interference with state autonomy, then the courts cannot abandon
their duty to enforce that limit simply because the political process appears to provide a tolerable substitute for
judicial review.") (criticizing in particular Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)
(Blackmun, J.)) (footnote omitted).
104. "[Q]uestions ofjurisdiction are really questions of power between States and Nation." Conversation Between Justice Louis D. Brandeis and Professor Felix Frankfurter, in Chatham, Mass. (June 28, 1923) (Frankfurter Papers, Library of Congress) (available on microfiche from the Library of Congress), quoted in Professor
Mary Brigid McManamon, Felix Frankfkrter: The Architect of "OurFederalism", 27 GA. L. REV. 697,703 (1993)
[hereinafter McManamon].
105. The doctrine ofjurisdictional "abstention" can be seen to have first reached full expression in the Supreme
Court's 1941 RailroadComm'n v. Pullman Co. decision. 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (Frankfurter, J.). Since Pullman,
the Court has consistently expanded the notion of abstention to avoid deciding many cases concerned with or
intersecting with state law. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987) (Powell, J.); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983) (Brennan, J.); Colorado River Water Conservation
Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976) (Brennan, J.); Huffman Ltd. v. Pursue, 420 U.S. 592 (1975)
(Rehnquist, J.); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (Black, J.); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux,
360 U.S. 25 (1959) (Frankfurter, J.); Burford v. Sun Oil, Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (Black, J.). Compare generally American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 114 S. Ct. 981 (1994) (Scalia, J.):
Under the federal doctrine of forum non conveniens, "when an alternative forum has jurisdiction to hear
[a] case, and when. . . the 'chosenforum [is]inappropriatebecause of considerationsaffecting the court's
own administrativeand legalproblems, 'the court may, in the exercise of its sound discretion, dismiss the
case," even if jurisdiction and proper venue are established.
Id. at 985-87 (quoting Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 (1981) (quoting Koster v. (American)
Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524 (1947))) (emphasis added) (alterations in original).
106. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (Brandeis, J.).
107. McManamon, supra note 104, at 703-05.
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Congress, not the Judiciary, defines the scope of federal jurisdiction within constitutionally permissible bounds,1" 8 and accordingly, that the federal courts' obligation to adjudicate claims within their jurisdiction is "virtually unflagging,""1 9 this
general principle does not eliminate, and the categorical assertions based upon it
do not call into question the federal courts' discretion in determining whether to
grant certain types of relief- a discretion that was part of the common-law background against which the statutes conferring jurisdiction were enacted. 10 Indeed,
"there are some classes of cases in which the [judicial] withholding of authorized
equitable relief because of undue interference with state proceedings is 'the normal
thing to do.'""
The development in the federal courts of relatively distinct abstention doctrines
illustrates especially well the inherent powers of the courts to respond to the excessive enlargement of federal court jurisdiction by Congress. 112 As Professor Barry
Friedman has put it: "No area proves more troublesome to proponents of the congressional control and obligation theories [of federal court jurisdiction] than the
abstention doctrines. .

.

.Abstention cases reflect pure common-law judicial de-

cisionmaking about whether to refrain from exercising the jurisdiction granted by
federal statutes." 13 It is true that the courts have seen fit to confine the applicability of the abstention doctrines - i.e., utilizing them only as extraordinary and narrow exceptions to a general duty of the federal courts to adjudicate the
controversies placed before them by acts of Congress."4 However, close attention
to the basic principles infusing the abstention doctrines illuminates that, should
Congress continue to create "federal" crimes and causes of action exceeding the
bounds of federalism and federal court adjudicative ability, the federal courts will
have no choice but to concomitantly expand the exercise of their inherent, "abstention" powers-so as to "check" the inefficient, Judiciary-subverting and federalism-thwarting excesses of the Legislature.

108. See, e.g., Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234 (1922) (Sutherland, J.).
109. See Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193,203 (1988) (Blackmun, J.) (quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976) (Brennan, J.)).
110. New Orleans Pub. Serv. Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 359 (1989) (Scalia, J.) (citing
Professor David L. Shapiro, Jurisdictionand Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543, 570-77 (1985)).
111. Id. at 359 (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971) (Black, I.)).
112. See generally Grode v. Mutual Fire, Marine and Inland Ins. Co., 8 F.3d 953,958 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982)) (emphasis added):
Acting pursuant to its authority under Article III of the United States Constitution, Congress has mandated that "[tihe district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." However, the Supreme Court has carved out several limited
exceptions where federal courts should abstain from exercising this grant ofjurisdiction due to overriding
principlesoffederalism, comity, andjudicial economy.
113. Professor Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress and FederalJurisdiction,
85 Nw. U. L. REV. 1,17 (1990) [hereinafter Friedman].
114. See, e.g., Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813-14 (1976) (Brennan, J.) ("Abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule.").
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We are not advocating that the courts use their inherent powers "to dismiss...
suit[s] merely becausea State court could entertain" them.11 Rather, we are simply
acknowledging that if Congress fails to exercise some measure of restraint in its
jurisdictional legislating, the federal courts may well be forced to react to such excess in a manner squarely recognizing that the cases Congress has placed within
the federal court system are not properly before them. The abstention doctrines
comprise just one especially well-established, distinct but evolving, aspect of the
Federal Judiciary's inherent, separate-branch power to fulfill its fundamental obligation of confining its reach within the bounds of federalism, comity, and sound
judicial administration (for the sake of rendering quality adjudications). And, as
the particular evolutionary patterns of the abstention doctrines illuminate, this
general inherent power of the Judiciary is as flexible as needs be."' 6 We think the
federal courts must be prepared to increase their utilization of their inherent "abstention" powers if Congress persists in increasing the number of essentially nonfederal, "federal" causes of action and crimes to the point of regularly,
systematically subverting federalism and the Judiciary's very adjudicative

115. See Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341, 361 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result) ("[I]t was never a doctrine of equity that a federal court should exercise its judicial discretion to
dismiss a suit merely because a State court could entertain it.") (emphasis added). See also Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (Black, J.) ("The concept [of federalism] does not mean blind deference to 'States' Rights' any
more than it means centralization of control over every important issue in our National Government and its
courts.").
116. For example, as Professor Mary Brigid McManamon has noted:
Justice Black's prophesy [in Younger] that the slogan ["Our Federalism"] would be important to our Nation's future has come true. While the word "federalism" is supposedly neutral, the Supreme Court has
increasingly used it in the last twenty years as a basis for deferring to the States at the expense of federal
jurisdiction. This increased deference has been dubbed "the new judicial federalism" and has caused
lively debate among late-twentieth-century jurists.
McManamon, supra note 104, at 705 (citing her searches of: LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file (June 25,
1991); WL, Allfeds database (June 25, 1991); and WL, AlIfeds-old database-for the proposition that the concept of federalism has been cited in reported federal opinions approximately 4000 times in the last 20 years, while
it was only cited about one tenth that many times in the two preceding centuries) (other citations omitted). See
also Friedman, supra note 113:
To be sure, the [Supreme Court] reports are replete with statements in dicta affording lip service to Congress's power to control the jurisdiction of the federal courts. But what the Court states rhetorically and
what the vast body of Supreme Court decisions indicate, are two completely different matters. . . . [T]he
Court often refers to the "virtually unflagging obligation" of the federal courts to exercise congressionally-conferred jurisdiction. But equally often, the Court disregards that supposed obligation. Thus
there is an apparent gap between the traditional scholarly approach to federal jurisdiction, and the fabric
of jurisdictional decisions woven by the Court.
Id. at 9-10 (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 15 (1983) (Brennan, J.)). See also Howard A. Matalon, Note, The Civil Indigent's Last Chancefor MeaningfulAccessto the Federal
Courts: The InherentPower to Mandate Pro Bono Publico, 71 B.U. L. REv. 545, 552 (1991) (footnotes omitted):
Although inherent powers originated with the creation of the courts themselves, the inherent powers doctrine has received attention only in recent years. The reason is linked to the close relationship between
modern courts and their inherent powers. As court duties and functions have increased - requiring added
fiscal expenses and resources- courts have stretched their inherent powers to cover the growth.
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ability."' Indeed, in our view, bedrock constitutional principles of checks and balances and separation of powers, at least, will in fact obligate the federal courts to
refuse to join in such legislative subversion of the country's basic governmental
structure.li'
In short, we join Professor David L. Shapiro in rejecting the unduly broad and
rigid, "pure congressional control" notion -i.e., "that in the absence of explicit
statutory language, there is a strong if not conclusive presumption that statutory
jurisdiction conferred" upon the federal courts "over the merits of a controversy
must be exercised."119 In the view of those who believe in this congressional control proposition which we reject: "[Jiudicial failure to fulfill this obligation constitutes 'judicial usurpation of legislative authority.' "120 But the view we share with
Professor Shapiro is quite different from this. We are of the view that "history, tradition, and policy support the existence of" a measure of "judicial discretion to interpret and apply jurisdictional grants and to refrain from reaching the merits of a

117. See, e.g., Resolution IX, supra note 8 1:
[B]y imposing on States federal standards and programs, the [Senate version of the most recent crime bill
in the national legislature] would curtail the selective use of pretrial detention, sentencing and parole; and
would invalidate principles of substantive state law- areas in which States have a constitutional responsibility under the principles of federalism and a long and proven history of successful initiatives; and. . . in
addition to contravening principles of federalism, this legislation is further flawed because it: 1)assumes
without foundation that states have been unresponsive and ineffective in addressing crime; . . . and 4)
disrupts funding of state criminal processes by favoring police and corrections with federal funds while
commensurate resources for courts, prosecutors, and defense coundisregarding the need this creates for
sel.
See also Congress Focuses on Cost of Crime, THE THIRD BRANCH (Admin. Office of the United States Courts,
Washington, D.C.), Mar. 1994, at 5 (quoting the recent testimony of Justice David H. Souter before the Senate
Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies:
"I'm afraid I don't have very much optimism that federal courts can become courts of unlimited criminal jurisdiction without incapacitating the ability of those courts to do what they do well now."). Compare United States v.
Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that the Gun-Free School Zones Act in the full reach of its terms is
invalid as beyond the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause), cert. granted, 114 S.Ct. 1536 (1994)
with United States v. Edwards, 13 F.3d 291 (9th Cir. 1993) (disagreeing with the Lopez court's Commerce
Clause construction). Comparealso United States v. Cortner, 834 F. Supp. 242 (M.D. Tenn. 1993) (holding that
Congress lacked power under the Commerce Clause to enact the Anti Car Theft Act of 1992) with United States
v. Johnson, No. 93-5974, 1994 WL 140293 (6th Cir. Apr. 22, 1994) (explaining and holding that while the
Cortner district court may be accurate in viewing the "carjacking" statute as unwise and inconsistent with traditional notions of federalism, the statute is "not unconstitutional under current Commerce Clause doctrine").
118. See, e.g., Friedman, supa note 113, at 58-60; id. at 62 n.6 ("To the extent that any two branches are in
agreement, the third branch ought. . . to consider its position very carefully.").
Moreover, as we have already mentioned, we think other, congressionally-imposedJudiciary powers and obligations actually recognize, implicitly or in effect, the structural, inherent power necessity of federal court "abstention" from the indiscriminate exercise of excessive congressional creations of federal court jurisdiction. See,
e.g., Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 471 (aiming to "facilitate deliberate adjudication of civil
cases on the merits, monitor discovery, improve litigation management, and ensurejust, speedy, and inexpensive
resolutions of civil disputes.") (emphasis added). See also, e.g., FED. R. Civ. PRO. 1 ("[These Rules] shall be
construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.") (emphasis added).
119. Professor David L. Shapiro, Commentary, Reflections on the Allocation ofJurisdictionBetween State and
Federal Courts: A Response to "Reassessingthe Allocation ofJudicialBusiness Between State and Federal Courts,"
78 VA. L. REv. 1839, 1844-45 (1992) [hereinafter Shapiro] (responding to Professor Martin H. Redish's article,
Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and Federal Courts: FederalJurisdiction and "The
Martian Chronicles,"78VA. L. REv. 1769 (1992); as well as to Professor Redish's book, THE FEDERAL COURTS IN
THE POLITICAL ORDER (1991)).

120. Shapiro, supra note 119, at 1844-45 (quoting MARTIN H. REDISH, THE FEDERAL CoURTS INTHE POLITICAL ORDER 49 (1991)).
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controversy even when the existence of jurisdiction is clear."12 1 For us, judicial
"discretion on matters of jurisdiction is not only ubiquitous but desirable ...
[D]iscretionary rules reflecting considerations of efficiency and comity [are] the
result of the proper exercise of judicial authority."122 Professor Barry Friedman
has also well-described our view: Contrary to the strict teachings of the congressional control school of thought, this nation's history has been one that encompasses changing conceptions of the role of the Supreme Court, and the need for
and responsibility of lower federal courts. And fixed theories of federal jurisdiction cannot readily take into account these changing conceptions. What Professor
Friedman terms the [inter-branch] "dialogic" approach, on the other hand, not
only has room for such changing norms, but actually facilitates them. 23 The
premise of this dialogic approach is that the constitutional text is broad enough to
leave largely unresolved questions of how far Congress may go in controlling federal jurisdiction and, conversely, to what extent the federal courts may resist such

121. Shapiro, supra note 119, at 1845 (citing Professor David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60
N.Y.U. L. REv. 543, 566-70 (1985)).
122. Shapiro, supra note 119, at 1845-46 (citation omitted). Compare American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 114
S. Ct. 981 (1994) (Scalia, J.):
Under the federal doctrine of forum non conveniens, "when an alternative forum has jurisdiction to hear
[a] case, and when. . . the 'chosenforum [is] inappropriatebecause of considerationsaffecting the court's
own administrativeand legalproblems, 'the court may, in the exercise of its sound discretion, dismiss the
case," even if jurisdiction and proper venue are established.
Id. at 985-87 (quoting Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 (1981) (quoting Koster v. (American)
Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524 (1947))) (emphasis added) (alterations in original).
123. Friedman, supra note 113, at 3. See also Professor Barry Friedman, Continuing Commentary, Federal
Jurisdictionand Legal Scholarship:A (Dialogic)Reply, 85 Nw. U. L. Rav. 478 (1991) [hereinafter Friedman, A
(Dialogic)Reply].
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control or assert themselves in defining the scope of federal jurisdiction.' 24 And
the governmental reality is that
[tihis uncertainty is resolved on a case-by-case basis through an elaborate dialogue between the branches. At times the dialogue is cooperative, with one branch or
the other seeking assistance in developing jurisdictional lines. At other times the dialogue is educative, with one branch teaching the other where it believes appropriate
lines ought to be drawn. And at some times it is more grave, like an elaborategame of

124. See Friedman, supra note 113, at 52; id. at 52-53 (citations omitted):
When determining whether to create federal courts and allocate cases to them, one might rightfully be
concerned about such issues as protection of federal rights and interests, considerations of comity and
federalism, caseloads and the extent of judicial resources, and the need for uniformity. An important
practical difference between the dialogic and the traditional models is which branch takes these considerations into account in fashioning federal jurisdiction. Under the traditional model, Congress bears sole
responsibility for making this multi-factored analysis-often, for example, weighing the need to protect
federal rights against any federalism or comity concerns implicated by federal court intervention. Under
the dialogic model, however, responsibility for weighing these factors is shared.
See also Friedman, A (Dialogic) Reply, supra note 123, at 490-91 (responding to Michael Lewis Wells, Continuing Commentary, Congress'sParamountRole in Setting the Scope ofFederalJurisdiction, 85 Nw. U. L. REv.465
(1991)):
Wells criticizes the dialogic approach for permitting an analysis of "many factors" when to him only two
factors-structure of government and individual rights-are the ones that matter. For example, Wells
denigrates the notion that federal caseload and "overworked federal judges" could possibly be as important as his "basic principles of political life." . . . [But claseload, uniformity, and the few other factors I
mention actually are all about individual rights and the structure of government. If overworked federal
judges are hearing diversity cases or federal drug cases, they are not giving close attention to equal protection cases .... When the Court adopts an abstention doctrine, it is choosing to hear certain cases over
others, and when Congress passes jurisdictional statutes, it is doing the same. Wells's "basic principles"
tend to be the overriding goal, but the real world debate is carried out in terms of these "lesser" practical
factors, factors that mean everything to his "basic principles."
ComparePHILLIP CHASE BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 59-73 (1982) ("Prudential Argument"); id. at 63 ("[A]
court's first responsibility is to decide whether it should decide."). Comparealso id. at 74-92 ("Structural Argument"); id. at 74 ("Structural [constitutional] arguments are inferences from the existence of constitutional structures and the relationships which the Constitution ordains among these structures."); id. at 91-92 (citing
CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969)) (emphasis added):
Structural arguments have not yet received the acceptance and attention they merit. This is perhaps partly
a reflection of a narrow-minded formalism that persists in law schools and can be observed wherever one
hears the clipped citation of a case which is, by its very mention, supposed to resolve a serious question.
There are doubtless other reasons why [Professor Charles L. Black, Jr.'s] Structureand Relationship in
ConstitutionalLaw is so much cited but so little applied. The future, however-once law professors have
integrated the structural method into their own -will see more of structural approaches. As government
qua producers gain more importance in our lives, and hence as intergovernmental questions are brought
to prominence, structural arguments will become more useful.
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"push-shove, "in which the branches125resist one another's view of when the exercise of
federal jurisdiction is appropriate.

Certainly, we think the necessary jurisdictional reform measures can be most effectively and economically achieved by the branches working in accordance with
the "cooperative" and "educative" modes of the dialogue described by Professor
Friedman -as opposed to the less efficient, "push-shove" mode. 126 Nonetheless,
we submit that plain prudence compels the federal courts to be prepared to heed
the call for deployment of their unilateral, inherent powers should congressional
restraint fail to materialize. The Judiciary must be prepared to act on its own, to
"save itself'-to fulfill its inherent responsibility to preserve quality adjudication,
federalism, and a well-balanced system of checks and balances within the nation's
constitutional scheme of courts and government.
B. An InherentJudicialPowers-Planfor Implementing a
DifferentialAppellate Case Management Mechanism
At the very least, absent more effective cooperation from Congress, the Judiciary must be prepared to draw upon its inherent powers to reform its own, appellate
case management procedures -by implementing local circuit rules enabling fair
differentiation between those cases in need of plenary review at the intermediate
appeal level and those not in need of such circuit attention.127 As we have discussed
above, while we view the tracking mechanism recommended by the Report to be
imperative-and the most viable appellate case differential management

125. Friedman, supra note 113, at 49 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). See also Judge Frank M. Coffin,
Working With the Congress of the Future, in FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, THE FEDERAL APPELLATE JUDICIARY IN

THE 2 1ST CENTURY 201 (Cynthia Harrison & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1989):
It is safe to say that the happiness, effectiveness, stability, and independence of the federal judiciary
depend to a very large extent on Congress. If it is sensitive and responsive to our needs, we shall remain
one of the most durable legacies of the founders of this nation. If it is not, long continued suspicion,
underfunding, petty harassment, minute oversight, and capricious additions to workload can be the
equivalent of a constitutional amendment repealing Article III.
See also id. at 211:
The Founding Fathers wrought soundly and, despite some foreshadowing by Montesquieu, contributed
an original concept to government, separation of powers. But in our complex age, for each power to fulfill
what was originally expected of it, there must be communication, the sense of a community of interest,
and sensitivity toward the needs and problems of each other. This offers to us, as we enter our third century, a challenge to ingenuity, patience, and understanding.
126. See generally LESTER C. THuRow, THE ZERo-SuM SOCIETY: DISTRIBUTION AND THE POSSIBILITIES FOR Ec-

ONOMIC CHANGE 12, 122-23 (1980) ("Once a goal has been legislated into law, the fight hasjust begun. To a great

extent the time delays and uncertainty that this process creates have a more adverse effect on the economy than
the regulations themselves.").
127. See, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 102, at 1298 ("The inherent powers of the courts. . . include the powers
of the judiciary to protect itself, to administer justice, to promulgate rules for practice, and to provide process
where none exists."); Professor Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARv. L. REv. 374,448 n.80 (1982) ("Federal courts have inherent power to make rules for the orderly conduct of their business."). Compare also the following, consistent, congressionally-imposedjudiciary powers and obligations: Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990,
28 U.S.C. § 471 (aiming to "facilitate deliberate adjudication of civil cases on the merits, monitor discovery,
improve litigation management, and ensurejust, speedy, and inexpensive resolutions of civil disputes") (emphasis added); FED. R. Civ. PRO. I ("[These Rules] shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action.") (emphasis added).
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mechanism for the time being -we also think that further evolution, to a "pure"
discretionary review regime, will be necessary in the near future.
VI. THE PRICE OF SYSTEMIC INACTION:
R.I.P. FEDERALISM AND QUALITY ADJUDICATION IN THE

FEDERAL COURTS

The compelling situation confronting the federal courts requires systemic plans
of action. The February 16, 1993, Report recommends federal court reform measures capable of restoring and conserving the basic values of federalism and quality adjudication within the federal court system. We think the recommendations of
the Report should be implemented.
At a minimum, Congress should act immediately to impose a period of procedural and structural experimentation upon the federal courts of appeal, which
would allow the various, contending procedural and structural circuit reform measures discussed in this Article to be tried and monitored for empirical purposes by
an independent research group - e.g., the Rand Corporation (as is being done now
with respect to the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 in the federal district
courts). 12 8 After a set, significant period of such experimentation in the circuit
courts, and after the results of the pilot programs are analyzed by the independent
research agency, Congress should find which pilot program has proved worthy of
enactment as the new procedural and structural paradigm for the entire federal
court institution - as the regime most capable of preserving the fundamental characteristics of the federal courts over the long term.
However, if Congress fails to so attend to the needs of federalism and quality
adjudication in the federal courts, we think the Judiciary must be prepared to draw
upon its inherent powers as a co-equal branch of the national government, to take
the then-necessary court reform measures that are available to it in an effort to save
itself (preserve federalism and fair, effective adjudication in the federal court system). We have tried to communicate through this Article our vision of how the
Committee's Report could be used as a set of inherent judicial power plans of
action for "self-help" federal court reform should congressional cooperation in
such reform efforts fail to materialize.
If both Congress and the Federal Judiciary fail to take action sufficiently consistent with the Report, we think the Republic will soon suffer the utter loss of federalism and quality adjudication in the federal courts. Should such fundamental
atrophy occur, the best that could be hoped for is that Congress would go ahead
and abolish what will then amount to but an unaffordably redundant, mere pretense of a dual justice system - by forthrightly creating and maintaining a unitary
system of justice that at least has some hope of administering justice in an effective, more quality-consistent fashion, even if not in a federalism-consistent one.
We can see no reason to pay but costly "lip service" to our constitutional scheme of
justice and maintain a two-fold, essentially indistinguishable and inefficient

128. See genemlly Parker & Hagin, supra note 4, at 1930-32.
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system of courts - which is all we will have if we permit the federal courts to stay
their current course on and over the precipice of federalism.
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APPENDIX A
Appeals Filedper Authorized Judgeship

1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993

Total

Criminal

Civil

Prisoner
Petitions

Other
Civil

Other
Appeals

57.3
53.9
61.8
69.7
77.2
86.7
81.6
89.8
94.0
105.6
120.2
131.8
149.8
161.1
169.4
171.7
189.8
197.1
195.0
153.2
175.8
199.7
211.7
224.5
238.6
213.8
219.8
225.5
240.5
254.7
262.2
251.7
275.6
298.0

9.2
7.9
9.9
12.4
13.4
15.7
16.6
18.9
21.6
25.9
27.4
33.0
41.0
45.9
41.9
43.2
47.9
48.8
46.3
31.1
33.4
33.2
36.1
36.3
37.0
32.0
32.9
33.7
38.5
51.4
60.9
59.6
65.6
71.2

34.1
32.3
35.4
39.5
46.3
52.1
47.1
50.8
52.3
62.1
72.2
78.4
86.6
91.5
97.2
97.9
107.3
113.2
115.1
92.6
112.5
128.9
142.3
153.4
164.6
151.1
155.7
163.7
171.0
172.9
173.8
164.4
179.5
190.3

4.5
5.2
7.0
9.2
11.3
13.2
12.6
15.2
17.9
21.6
25.4
26.1
27.0
29.2
29.1
25.1
25.2
26.1
22.9
20.9
27.9
32.7
36.6
40.4
45.2
41.9
44.8
54.4
59.3
61.3
63.7
63.3
70.5
75.0

29.6
27.1
28.3
30.3
34.9
38.9
34.6
35.7
34.4
40.5
46.8
52.2
59.6
62.3
68.0
72.7
82.1
87.1
92.1
71.7
84.6
96.2
105.7
113.0
119.4
109.2
110.9
109.3
111.7
111.6
110.1
101.1
109.0
115.3

14.0
13.7
16.6
17.8
17.6
19.0
17.9
20.1
20.1
17.7
20.6
20.5
22.2
23.7
30.4
30.7
34.6
35.1
33.7
29.5
29.9
37.7
33.3
34.8
37.0
30.8
31.2
28.1
31.0
30.4
27.5
27.7
30.5
36.5

Source: Long Range PlanningOffice,
Administrative Office of the United States Courts
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APPENDIX B
Terminations perAuthorized Judgeship

1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993

Total

Consolidation

Procedural

Merit

57.9
55.2
53.4
64.2
73.1
74.0
74.7
85.5
85.2
92.9
110.3
127.5
142.6
155.8
159.0
164.9
169.3
183.3
182.6
143.1
158.2
189.9
212.0
217.1
236.3
201.2
216.5
220.8
230.1
239.6
246.9
248.0
257.1
284.2

3.3
3.3
3.0
5.1
7.8
7.0
7.2
9.5
9.2
9.4
11.1
14.1
14.2
16.0
20.0
19.8
19.2
23.9
29.6
24.4
20.5
26.8
31.8
31.7
29.9
17.1
18.3
17.2
17.3
18.8
21.2
24.6
23.3
22.2

15.2
15.9
13.3
18.5
19.7
21.5
21.0
25.3
27.9
30.7
35.9
35.0
40.4
40.6
51.9
51.5
53.8
41.9
61.8
48.1
57.4
70.9
83.8
85.3
97.8
79.2
81.6
85.0
89.8
96.9
91.0
87.4
95.1
108.9

39.4
36.0
37.1
40.7
45.5
45.5
46.4
50.8
48.1
52.8
63.3
78.4
88.0
99.2
87.1
93.6
96.4
117.5
91.2
70.9
80.4
92.2
96.4
100.1
108.5
104.9
116.7
118.6
122.9
123.9
134.7
136.0
138.7
153.1

Source: Long Range PlanningOffice,
Administrative Office of the United States Courts
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APPENDIX C
REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE
ON COURT ADMINISTRATION AND CASE MANAGEMENT

To
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE
ON LONG RANGE PLANNING

[Note: The report has been edited to conform to Mississippi
College Law Review publication standards -ed.]
The federal Judiciary has accepted the challenge to devise a long-range plan that
will provide for the needs of the federal court system, the public, the bar, and litigants for the foreseeable future. The vision we collectively bring to this endeavor
should address the issues that underlie the trenchant question posed by the Chief
Justice:
What should be the future role of the federal courts?.... The question transcends
the personal concerns of sitting federal judges. It involves, instead, the kind of federal court system we will bequeath to our children and grandchildren. 1
The Judicial Conference Long-Range Planning Committee, in moving to confront this challenge, has asked the Conference's standing committees to consider a
host of long-range planning questions falling within their respective mandates.
Some of these questions, particularly those relating to the structure and governance of the federal courts, have occupied much of the time and resources of the
Court Administration and Case Management Committee for the past year. We
have reached two overarching conclusions:
1. Substantial change in both the structure of the federal courts and the manner in
which they provide services to the nation is essential to maintaining the historical
nature of the institution and continuing to play a vital role in our nation's affairs.
2. The Long Range Planning Committee should serve not only as a clearinghouse
for suggestions such as the ones contained in this report, but it should also be the
forum for extended debate on these and other issues.
The Court Administration and Case Management Committee therefore submits
this report to the Long Range Planning Committee and requests that Committee to
initiate the debate and other forms of consideration necessary to inform its decision on incorporating the recommendations in its Long Range Plan.
In the course of our work, we held a conference in which we heard from the
distinguished people listed in Attachment A. They provided the committee with a
wide variety of perspectives on how well the federal courts are meeting the de-

I. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Remarks at Kastenmeier Lecture, University of Wisconsin-Madison, at 10-11 (Sept. 15, 1992).
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mand for modern dispute resolution and on various opportunities to strengthen the
courts' continued capability for meeting that demand.
The work of the committee has been greatly assisted by its reporter, Professor
Francis McGovern, by William Eldridge of the Federal Judicial Center, and by
Fred Russillo of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.
I.

SIZE OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY

Recommendation: The size of the tenured Article III federal Judiciary should be limited to the present number of authorized judgeships, along with any increases for
which need has been established by the Judicial Conference at the time of the adoption of a Long Range Plan, but not to exceed 1000 Judgeships.
This recommendation recognizes that, historically, the federal courts have reflected the framers' intent to provide a judicial forum that would perform the distinctive tasks arising out of our distinctive federal structure- tasks not ordinarily
appropriate under that structure for the state courts. We believe this role is being
threatened by moves toward a policy of assigning to the federal courts tasks that
are perceived as, in some undefined way, "better" for the federal courts, rather
than essential to the maintenance of the traditional capability to handle cases of national effect, cases involving protection of individual liberties, and certain categories of complex cases. The concomitant of this shift has been a growth in the size
of the federal judicial establishment that portends serious changes that some are
just beginning to appreciate and that others are deeply concerned about.
There is no single path to meeting the challenge facing us. We must continue to
perform at our highest level of quality and efficiency and we must bring to bear the
reserves of commitment and cooperation at all levels of government. In issuing his
call for reexamination of the role of federal courts, Chief Justice Rehnquist has
called on us to: (1) recognize the benefits of renewed cooperation with the state
court systems; (2) consider curtailing some federal jurisdiction; and (3) avoid adding new federal causes of action unless critical to meeting important national interforums, alternative
ests which cannot otherwise be satisfied through non-judicial
2
dispute resolution techniques, or the state courts.
A. Effects of Unlimited Growth
1. Altering the Beneficial Balance of State/Federal Responsibility
In addition to federal court growth resulting from increases in population and
the complexity of business enterprises, growth is strongly affected by the changes
in the nature of the tasks being assigned to the federal courts. Effects cannot be
thoroughly separated and assigned to these two related causes. We must note,
however, that a particularly troubling effect is the change in the relationship between federal and state courts. As the federal courts take on more and more aspects of courts of general jurisdiction funded by the federal government, we risk

2. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Remarks to A.B.A. House of Delegates at 10 (Feb. 4, 1992).

1994]

FEDERAL COURTSAT THE CROSSROADS: ADAPTOR LOSE!

disturbing the complementary relationship that has served the nation well. It is
simply not possible to supplant the state courts' role and, at the same time, retain
the benefits that have been realized from two systems, each doing its own job under an overall system of divided, balanced responsibilities. We believe those benefits are already at risk.
2. Altering the Character of the Federal Bench
The traditional work of federal courts has drawn to the federal bench men and
women who have been very good at the tasks that make the federal courts distinctive forums. Some of the growth in the federal courts' workload can be accounted
for by increased filings in the distinctive categories of litigation that have traditionally characterized our dockets, but our experience suggests that a very substantial portion of recent growth can be accounted for by categories that are not
part of the traditional distinctive docket. Diluting the distinctiveness of the judicial work and the attendant commonality of interests among the judges drawn to
the work is bound to change the character of the courts, the quality of output, and
the influence of the institution. Such changes in the institution brought on by continued growth will undoubtedly adversely affect our ability to attract the talented
people who have traditionally been drawn to these special courts.
This is not an argument grounded in elitism or status. It is simply a near-truism
that persons with shared aspirations focusing on a discrete and special function
are likely to develop from their shared experience a keen appreciation for what
their institution can do. They recognize opportunities for reshaping processes
without reshaping the institution they serve. They can assess the potential for innovation with due regard for preserving everything necessary to maintain the distinctive role for which we are deeply concerned. If we are right in our belief that
size is a threat to this special federal court character, it behooves us to take every
reasonable step to neutralize the threat.
3. Management Burdens Arising From a Large Staff Substructure
Growth of the federal courts' workload has also produced an attendant growth
of support personnel that has been necessary, but is nonetheless alarming when we
consider the drain on judge time required for administrative and management responsibilities. The following table shows growth in court support staff over the
past twenty-one years:
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Judgeships and Support Personnel - 1970 & 1991 *
[Ratio of Support to Judgeships in (]

Total
Judgeships

Support
Personnel
in
Individual Courts

Support
Personnel
in
Administrative
Office

19703

498

6,641 (13.3)

198(0.4)

19914

816

20,946 (25.7)

881(1.1)

newly established Federal Judicial Center was just beginning to form its staff
in 1970. In 1991 it had 119 employees, a ratio of 0. 15.
* The

Substantial supporting staff will remain an essential resource to a smoothrunning court operation. The committee believes, however, that the proposals advanced in this report would significantly reduce administrative burdens on judges.
First, a sharp reduction in the number of districts would simplify structures and
eliminate duplicate positions at several levels. Second, the installation of professional managers would relieve judges of administrative duties while reserving to
them authority over policy issues arising from administrative matters.
B. How Big is TOO Big?
Various approaches to forecasting future growth arrive at markedly varying estimates. In this committee's view, we do not need to appraise the methodological
controversies nor settle on some future time at which an unacceptable growth will
be reached. We believe the courts have already reached a threshold requiring
action. If we merely continue the growth shown in the above table, with no increase in the rate, in twenty years we will have 1338 judges supported by nearly
35,000 employees in the individual courts and 1700 in Washington. Such growth
arising from increasing federalization of state law will fundamentally change the
nature of the institution, which has in the past been limited to handling complex
cases, cases that have a national interest, and protecting individual liberties. We
can expect, however, that the increases would be even greater since growth in
judgeships over the past twenty years has been held down through extraordinary
efforts by judges and staff to handle increasing workloads without proportionate
increases in judgeships. While we expect to continue the search for efficiency, we
cannot expect that effort to meet the caseload rises we have seen in recent years.
It is in this context that we arrive at our recommendation that the number of
federal judgeships be limited to the number now in service plus any additional
judgeships already determined to be needed before the limits take effect.
3. Data provided by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.
4. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1992 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR

tbl. 28 (1992).
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The committee recognizes that a federal court system with a fixed limit on
judgeships will require the courts to become models of case management simply to
manage the likely increases in filings within present jurisdictional structures. If
fixed limits are approved, Congress will have to address jurisdictional priorities
whenever it is urged to create federal causes of action that will add to caseload burdens. When the sun rises on new causes of action or crimes, it must set on some
old ones.
The committee's recommendation to cap the size of the federal judiciary is limited to tenured Article Ill judges. We recognize that increasing the number of magistrate judges may be essential to case management efficiencies that will conserve
more of the time of tenured judges for tasks constitutionally reserved to them.
Since magistrate judges and bankruptcy judges are not guaranteed life tenure, their
numbers may be more readily adjusted. The need for bankruptcy judges will fluctuate with the status of the economy. We expect the need for magistrate judges to
grow if their role continues to be expansively defined.
II. THE ORGANIZATION

OF THE FEDERAL COURTS

The proposals presented next are intended to implement the goals described
above and the reorganization of district courts described below. The committee
believes that capping the number of districtjudges, congressional restraint on new
causes of action, and new caseload management approaches will permit the
achievement of the overall package of recommended changes in acceptable time
frames.
A. Regarding Courtsof Appeal
Recommendation: There should be ten circuits; each comprising one court of appeals and one district court.
The committee recommends that the circuits be realigned, to create ten circuits
that will evenly distribute the national appellate caseload.
Avoiding continued increase in the number of circuits is a major goal of this
committee's proposal. More circuits mean more intercircuit conflicts creating
pressure on the Supreme Court to bring uniformity to our body of federal law. We
have considered alternatives such as specialized appellate courts and a single, national court of appeals. Despite the benefits to uniformity of national law that
would be facilitated by these suggestions, we are persuaded that the percolation of
law that is afforded by consideration of issues in multiple circuits outweighs the
benefits that accompany either national or specialized courts of appeal.
Recommendation: Each court of appeals should have twelve judges.
If circuits are to be retained, each must have a coherent body of circuit law. The
law of the circuit, with its attendant predictability, can best be created and preserved by a body of judges small enough to function truly as a court. We believe
the functional limit to such a court is twelve.
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Large courts of appeal present too great an opportunity for producing law of the
panel rather than law of the circuit. The opportunity for intracircuit conflicts is
even greater. The resulting signal of unpredictability is unsettling to the public, the
business community, and the district courts. Unpredictability generates more litigation, thereby fueling the problem rather that solving it.
Collegiality is fostered by a court of manageable size. Collegiality should not be
viewed simply as a factor in the quality of professional life desired by judges. It is
rather a critical element in our conception that vital decisions made by single individuals should be reviewed by others. Collegiality, at its best, helps to assure that
the reviewers are speaking from shared values of the legal system even when they
disagree on specific outcomes. We are confident that the diminution of collegiality
in courts larger than twelve judges is a risk that the judicial system and the nation
can ill afford.
Recommendation: There should be a two-track method of appellate review.

The committee is persuaded that applying case management techniques, such
as those in the model shown in Attachment B, will enable the courts of appeal to
afford each case the attention it requires, provide due consideration of the merits,
and conserve judicial time. Under the proposed model, each case would begin on
Track One. Parties would provide a fifteen page brief that identifies the parties,
pertinent orders from the court below, questions presented for review, argument
and authorities relied upon, and appropriate record excerpts. The court should be
able to dispose of a significant number of cases at this stage without further submission by the parties or additional costs to the litigants. Cases that are not appropriate for disposition on Track One may at any time be scheduled for plenary
(Track Two) review with or without oral argument.
The committee recognizes that practices in some courts of appeal already embrace some elements of this model. The committee believes, however, that regularization through rules and formal practice will, when combined with results
from other recommendations, contribute sufficient economies for the courts to reduce membership to twelve judges in each of the ten circuits through attrition while
responding adequately to caseload demands. The committee has also considered
the alternatives of pure discretionary review or the creation of an appellate division of the district court. Each of these alternatives has merit. But the fact that the
courts of appeal have traditionally been courts concerned with error correction
has prompted the committee to reject the alternative of pure discretionary review.
The creation of an appellate section of the district court is a workable solution, but
would probably require additional district judges.
The committee does believe that the benefit to be realized from limiting the
number of circuits to ten and the number of appellate judges in each circuit to
twelve is such that the committee would urge adoption of either pure discretionary
review or the creation of a district court appellate division if the recommended
case management approach is rejected or unavailing.
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The committee also considered and rejected the creation of a unified circuitdistrict bench, an intermediate appellate court, and various proposals for resolving
inter-circuit conflicts.
Recommendation: There should be an appellate council comprising the court of appeals sitting as a committee of the whole with the chiefjudge of the court of appeals
presiding.
Administrative matters affecting a court of appeals would be the responsibility
of the circuit appellate council. This recommendation, along with a companion
one below regarding district courts, reflects the view of the committee that the administrative issues and needs of the two courts are distinctive and not readily perceived or addressed by judges with limited or no experience in the other forum.
Accordingly, this recommendation and its companion below would create one
body in each court to handle the duties assigned to the existing circuit councils under 28 U.S.C. § 332.
B. Regarding DistrictCourts

Recommendation: Each circuit should have one district court with boundaries coterminous with the circuit.
The federal trial court is presently fragmented into ninety-four districts with
many times that number of formal and informal subdivisions. Boundaries of the
districts often reflect happenstance, evolutionary growth, and once-upon-a-time
rational factors that have disappeared or been forgotten. What cannot be ignored
is that the proliferation of districts and their subdivisions brings attendant cadres of
administrative staff, repeated in structure, if not in number, in all the districts.
The committee is convinced that so many districts and repetitive staff are unneeded and place an administrative drain on judge time available for judicial tasks.
Disparities in the critical elements of district operations are well known: caseloads, pace of dispositions, productivity, and resources are uneven. Comparably
efficient administration is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve across ninetyfour districts under the best of conditions. And we do not have the best of conditions. Judges rise to chief judgeship by longevity -a qualification likely to reflect
skill at judicial tasks honed by experience; but each new chief arrives with virtually no experience in confronting the administrative problems of a court.
The most critical feature of the proposal for circuit-wide districts is the greatly
facilitated flexibility it affords in providingjudge power where it is needed. Today,
retirement of a judge in a modestly burdened court will provide a new judge and a
senior judge to that court while judges in a nearby heavily-burdened court will face
continued overwork and growing backlogs. The committee's recommendation
will not provide a panacea to this problem, but it will surely afford much improved
opportunity for addressing such disparities within the proposed districts.
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Recommendation: There should be a district council in each circuit comprised of a
minimum of five district judges or at least one from each state in the circuit, one
bankruptcy judge, and one magistrate judge.
As mentioned above in discussion of the courts of appeal, the committee believes that administrative and operational problems and opportunities in the trial
and appellate courts are sufficiently different to warrant separate governance
structures. This recommendation is grounded in such conviction.
C. Selection of Council Members and Council Chair
We propose that council members representing states should be selected by all
active district judges residing in the state. When fewer than five states make up a
circuit, the district judge representatives needed to meet the complement of five
should be selected by all the active district judges in the circuit.
Bankruptcy judges will choose one of their number to serve, as will the district's
magistrate judges.
Each council member should have five years experience. Each member should
serve for a five-year term. And the chair of the district council should be selected
by the elected council members.
D. Duties of the Council
1. The council should function much like a board of directors: setting policy; approving or modifying budgets; guiding the planning for the district as it relates to
facilities and resources; and assigning judges to the areas of greatest need.
2. The district council should have responsibility for selecting a professionallyqualified, district court administrator or district executive who would be given authority to manage the administrative affairs of the district court under direction of
the council.
E. RegardingJointResponsibilitiesof
the Court ofAppeals and the District Court
Recommendation: There should be a seven-member committee in each circuit to

handle disciplinary matters, including complaints filed under 28 U.S.C. § 372(c).
This disciplinary committee should be comprised of three members of the court of
appeals selected by the appellate council and three members of the district court selected by the district council. The chief judge of the court of appeals should serve as
chair.
The committee recognizes that 28 U.S.C. § 372(c) calls for procedures in
which complaints against ajudicial officer are not disposed of entirely by the court
colleagues of the officer complained of. Accordingly, we have recommended a
procedure that retains the basic elements of the current statutory scheme. We believe this procedure should continue to provide assurance to the public that complaints are reviewed and acted on without undue influence arising from close.
working relationships among the review participants.
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Attachment A
to the Report of the Judicial Conference Committee
on Court Administration and Case Management to
the Judicial Conference Committee on Long Range Planning
Judges
Honorable Thomas F. Hogan
Judge, United States District Court for the District of Columbia
Chair, Judicial Conference Committee on Intercircuit Assignments
Honorable Robert Nicholson
Justice, Supreme Court of Western Australia
Honorable Judith W. Rogers
Chief Judge, District of Columbia Court of Appeals
(now Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit)
Honorable Deanell R. Tacha
Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
Chair, Judicial Conference Committee on the Judicial Branch
United States Department ofJusticeRepresentative
Honorable Kenneth W. Starr
Solicitor General of the United States
(now with Kirkland & Ellis; Washington, D.C.)
PrivateSector Attorneys
Zoe E. Baird, Esq.
Senior Vice President and General Counsel
Aetna Life and Casualty
Julius L. Chambers, Esq.
Director and Counsel
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.
Robinson 0. Everett, Esq.
Everett, Gaskins, Hancock & Stevens
Raleigh, North Carolina
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Fred F. Fielding, Esq.
Wiley, Rein & Fielding
Washington, D.C.
Louise A. LaMothe, Esq.
Irell & Manella
Los Angeles, California
(now with Riordan & McKinzie; Los Angeles, California)
Hugh R. Overholt, Esq.
McNair & Sanford
Washington, D.C.
Judge Charles B. Renfrew
General Counsel and Vice President of Legal Affairs Chevron Corporation
(now with LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & Macrae; San Francisco, California)
JudicialSystem Staff
Duane R. Lee
Chief, Court Administration Division
Administrative Office of the United States Courts
Russell R. Wheeler
Deputy Director
Federal Judicial Center
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Attachment B
of
the
Judicial Conference Committee
to the Report
on Court Administration and Case Management to
the Judicial Conference Committee on Long Range Planning
Appellate Case Management Model
Track One
In each case, Appellant shall file the following with the court of appeals.
A.

A Track One brief containing:
1. A list of all parties unless the names appear in the caption of the case;
2. A table of authorities;
3. A jurisdictional statement;
4. A short and concise statement of the questions presented for review;
5. A concise statement of the facts material to the questions presented for
review;
6. A concise argument of the merits of the appeal.

B.

An Appendix containing:
1. Thejudgments, opinions, orders, findings of fact, and conclusions of law
of the district court pertinent to the appeal;
2. Record excerpts pertinent to the questions presented for review.

The Track One Appellant's brief shall not exceed fifteen pages, excluding the
Appendix with record excerpts.
In each Track One case, Appellee's filings are as follows.
A.

A Track One reply brief containing:
1. A list of all parties unless the names appear in the caption of the case;
2. A table of authorities;
3. A jurisdictional statement;
4. A concise statement of the facts material to the questions presented for
review;
5. A concise argument of the merits of the appeal.

B.

An Appendix containing:
1. The judgments, opinions, orders, findings of fact, and conclusions of law
of the district court pertinent to the appeal;
2. Record excerpts pertinent to the questions presented for review.

The Track One reply brief shall not exceed fifteen pages, excluding the Appendix
with record excerpts.
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Track Two
Track Two shall be plenary review. In any case assigned to Track Two review,
the court of appeals may permit or require the parties to:
1. Supplement the briefs filed in Track One to the extent ordered;
2. Permit full briefing of the questions presented for review; or
3. Supplement the record or file the complete record.
The court of appeals may consider Track Two appeals with or without oral argument.
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APPENDIX D
Appeals Terminated per Authorized Judgeship, 1960-1993

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

